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ABSTRACT  
The Trinitarian doctrine of Abū al-Farağ ʻAbd Allah Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib 
(10
th
-11
th
 c.) may be considered a good example of an interpretation of the 
Trinitarian theology and metaphysical system of Babai the Great (7th c.). Ba-
bai made an effort to discern between metaphysical terms, such as: substance 
(kyānā), hypostasis (qnōmā), and person (parṣōpā), making a peculiar mix-
ture of Cappadocian, Nestorian, i.e., East Syrian, and Antiochene theology. 
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, however, did not make use of Babai‟s terminology. Particu-
larly, although he explained the Trinitarian dogma in a similar way to Babai, 
he did not apply the term person (parṣōpā) to the Trinitarian theology. This 
paper aims to show the importance of the Trinitarian thought of Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib. It also answers the following questions: 1) how was he able to make 
an excellent interpretation of Babai‟s thought in the language and ambient of 
Islam, and 2) why did he consider it the best way to explain the Trinitarian 
dogma to the Muslims? 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians was the foundation stone 
for the Trinitarian dogma of the Church. In the first synods of the Church of 
the East, there are archaic expressions and a particular Trinitarian terminolo-
gy: God is one nature (kyānā) and three hypostases (qnōmē). Babai the Great 
(7th century) introduces an important development in the Trinitarian and 
Christological doctrine and terminology within the Church of the East. His 
effort was to discern between such terms as: nature (kyānā), hypostasis 
(qnōmā) and person (parṣōpā), a peculiar mixture of both Cappadocian and 
Antiochene theology. His philosophical terminology and theological doc-
trine was officially recognized by his church at the assembly of bishops in 
612, but only with respect to its Christological part. As for his philosophical 
approach to the Trinitarian dogma, it was not totally approved, or we can say 
that it was neither accepted nor rejected.  
In the 10th and 11th centuries, the Trinitarian theology of Abū al-Farağ 
ʻAbd Allah Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, an important theologian of the Church of the 
East, can be considered a good example of an interpretation of Babai‟s Trini-
tarian theology. It is worth noting that Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib respected the desire of 
his church not to apply the term “person” (parṣōpā) to its Trinitarian theolo-
gy as Babai did. Rather, he explained the Trinitarian dogma by elaborating 
on Babai‟s metaphysical system from an Aristotelian philosophical context. 
This paper aims to present and analyze the metaphysical systems of Ba-
bai and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in order to determine the common nucleus between the 
two, and then to analyze the further development of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib. Addition-
ally, it will demonstrate the importance of the Trinitarian thought of Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib, and his ability to explain the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas 
in the language and milieu of Islam, using traditional terminology and mak-
ing an excellent interpretation and modification of Babai‟s metaphysical sys-
tem. It will be also shown that with his elaboration of Babai‟s metaphysical 
system, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib created his own system. This new and particular met-
aphysical system was a good way to answer questions posed by the Muslims 
of his time regarding the Trinitarian dogma.  
Before beginning our analysis, we would like to make some terminolog-
ical remarks. First of all regarding the term qnōmā: it is the Syriac transla-
tion of the Greek ὑπόζηαζις, usually translated by scholars as “hypostasis” 
(at least in a Trinitarian context)1, although it should be noted that not all 
                                                            
1) Cf. PATROS, “La cristologia”, pp. 29-31. 
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scholars accept this translation2. In fact, in the history of the Christian doc-
trine, the term hypostasis did not have one meaning and a unique metaphysi-
cal function. When hypostasis was translated into Syriac with the term 
qnōmā, it did not always have one specific meaning attributed to it by the 
Syriac theologians, and did not always correspond to the meaning attributed 
to it by the Greeks. Nevertheless, we will use terms, hypostasis and qnōmā, 
as synonyms.  
The same applies to the term parṣōpā, which is the Syriac term for the 
Greek πρόζφπον3. It was used in different ways to explain either Trinitarian 
theology or Christological doctrine. In the Syriac tradition, it was also used 
with different meanings and significances. For this reason, we will use the 
term parṣōpā with the English translation of the Greek term πρόζφπον, i.e., 
person4. Following is a list of English translations that will be used for Ara-
bic philosophical terms: “essence” will be used for ḏāt; “substance” for 
ğawhar; “hypostasis” for uqnūm; “person” for šaḫṣ and farṣūf; “attribute” 
for ṣifah, and “property” for ḫāṣṣah. 
In addition, we chose to refer to the Church of the East also as Nestori-
an. This is not meant to be polemical or offensive in any way. We prefer to 
use this term because the same Church in 612 considered its doctrine to be 
Nestorian, a term that became synonymous with orthodoxy5. We also prefer 
to use the term Miaphysites for the Jacobites, i.e., the Syrians who did not 
accept the Council of Chalcedon, the non-Chalcedonians of Syriac language. 
Finally, for those who accepted Chalcedon, we use the term Chalcedonians. 
                                                            
2) Cf. BROCK, “The Christology”, p. 131.  
3) Cf. PATROS, “La cristologia”, p. 31. 
4) We think that translating the term qnōmā with hypostasis, and parṣōpā with per-
son/πρόζφπον, is not wrong. The important thing is to underline the various comprehensions of 
the terms and the different meanings and metaphysical functions they hold, cf. André DE HAL-
LEUX, “ „Hypostase‟ et „personne‟ dans la formation du dogme trinitaire (ca. 375-381)”, in 
André DE HALLEUX, Patrologie et œcuménisme. Recueil d‟études, Peeters, Leuven, 1990, pp. 
113-214; Andrea MILANO, Persona in teologia. Alle origini del significato di persona nel 
cristianesimo antico, Éditions Dehoniane, Naples, 1984; TURCESCU, “Prosopon”, pp. 374-395; 
while for the meaning of these terms in the Eastern Syriac tradition see PATROS, “La 
cristologia”, pp. 28-33.  
5) Cf. CHABOT, Synodicon, pp. 573-574: 
» ܨܝܪ̈ܬ ܪܣܐܦܕ ܨܧܝܨܠܐܮܣ ܠܐ ܕܡܝܬܐ ܥܝܪܣ ܐܮܝܧܒܘܝ ܨܣܕ ܐܪܔܦ ܬܘܠ ܐܮܡܣ ܐܗܠܐܕ ܐܬܘܝܕܛܒ ܢܐ
ܐܒܐ ܐܗܠܐ ܨܣ ܨ̈ܝܧܒ...  ܐܝܣ̈ܕܩ ܐ̈ܧܦܡܣܕ ܐܬܘܧܤܝܗܕ ܐܮܩܐܮܫ ܨܣܕ ܆ ̣ܮܠܐܮܫܐܕ ܝ̇ܗ ܢܥܕ ܐܤܓܮܦ ܝܦܘܦ
܆ ܘܤܡܫܐ  ܨܝ̈ܖܬ ܐܛܝܬܣܕ ܪ̇ܣܐܕ ܭܦܐ ܮܝܐ ܫܝܪܘܞܪܧܠ ܐܣܕܥܘ .ܐܝܪ̈ܝܕ ܘܐ ܆ ܘܝܡܝܨܐ ܐܧܝܪ̈ܘܞܪܦܨܝܧ̈ܝܟ  ܨܝܪ̈ܬܘ
ܠܐ ܘܐ ܆ ܝܗܘܮܝܐ ܨܝܣܘܧܩ». 
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A. BABAI THE GREAT AND HIS DOCTRINE 
Until the year 612, the doctrine of the Church of the East used a certain 
metaphysical terminology to express Trinitarian and Christological dogmas: 
1) God is one nature (kyānā) and three hypostases (qnōmē), the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit; 2) Christ is one person (parṣōpā) and two natures 
(kyānē), united without division or mixture6. 
During the Christological discussions within the Church of the East, for 
ecclesiastical, political and doctrinal reasons, some theologians began to de-
velop metaphysically its Christology. The role of the schools and some mon-
asteries was important in this development7. The so-called “controversy of 
Ḥenanā of Adiabene” was the most significant event which shows the theo-
logical discussion within the same church and the direct and indirect contacts 
between it and the other churches-confessions, i.e., the Chalcedonians and 
the non-Chalcedonians (Miaphysites)8. The most important figure, whose 
activity as a monk, spiritual leader and theologian had the major influence on 
the Church of the East and its official doctrine, was Babai the Great9.  
Babai the Great10 was born ca. 551 in the area of Beth „Aynatha. He be-
came a monk in the “Great Monastery” founded by Abraham of Kaškar 
(†588)11, to whom he became superior and spiritual leader. After the death of 
the Catholicos of the Church of the East, mar Grigor (†610)12, Chosroes II 
(d. 628), the Sasanian emperor, did not allow the bishops of this church to 
elect a new Catholicos. Until Chosroes‟ death, the church was led by the 
archdeacon Aba of Seleucia and Babai, who had the appointment of “visitor 
of the monasteries”. In the year 612, according to the will of Babai, an as-
                                                            
6) On this topic, see our article EBEID, “The Christology”; see also the following refer-
ences: BROCK, “The Christology”, pp. 125-142; Sebastian P. BROCK, “The Christology of 
the Church of the East”, in Dmitry AFINOGENOV & ALEXEY MURAVIEV (ed.), Traditions and 
Heritage of the Christian East, Izdatelstvo, Moscow, 1996, pp. 159-179; PATROS, “La cristo-
logia”, pp. 27-42.  
7) In this regard see BECKER, Fear. 
8) On the controversy of Ḥennanā see CHILDERS, “Ḥenana”, p. 194; BAUM & WINKLER, 
The Church, pp. 35-41; BECKER, Fear , pp. 90-91; EBEID, “The Christology”, pp. 377, 389-
390, 394-395. 
9) Cf. BAUM & WINKLER, The Church, p. 38.  
10) On Babai, his life and his historical context see BROCK, “Babai the Great”, pp. 49-
50; W BAUM & WINKLER, The Church, pp. 37-41. 
11) On Abraham of Kashkar see Lucas VAN ROMPAY, “Abraham of Kashkar”, in 
GEDSH, pp. 8-9; Sabino CHIALÀ, Abramo di Kashkar e la sua comunità. La rinascita del 
monachesimo siro-orientale, Qiqajon, Magnano, 2005. 
12) On this catholicos see Lucas VAN ROMPAY, “Grigor I”, in GEDSH, p. 183. 
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sembly of bishops was held, which adopted a new Christological formula: 
Christ is one person (parṣōpā) in which were united, without mixture or sep-
aration, two natures (kyānē) and two hypostases (qnōmē)13.  
Certainly, this was the contribution of the metaphysical development 
that Babai made and expressed in his “Book of the Union”14, which we will 
briefly present in this paper. It is to be noted that Babai‟s theological system 
was adopted partly by the assembly of 612. This does not mean that his met-
aphysical system, especially regarding his Trinitarian thought, was totally 
rejected or was not used by others15. The main part of our paper here, in fact, 
will focus on how Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib used and interpreted Babai‟s metaphysical 
system to explain the Trinitarian doctrine to Muslims. 
1. Babai the Great‟s metaphysical system 
Going back to Babai‟s metaphysical system, we should always keep in 
mind that in the internal Christological discussion among the theologians 
and thinkers of the Church of the East there were questions regarding the 
two natures of Christ and their real union. If Christ is one person with two 
united natures, and these natures maintain their properties, should we con-
sider the union real or not? In addition, the presence of the Miaphysites (Jac-
obites) into the Sasanian land, and their propaganda against the traditional 
doctrine of the Church of the East considering it a dualistic Christology and 
accusing it to be real Nestorianism, i.e., the doctrine of two separated sub-
jects in Christ, had made a group of theologians of this church refute any 
non-dualistic Christological formula or proposal. They considered such doc-
trines a betrayal of the faith of the Church, that is, in Christ the united na-
tures are perfect and each one conserves its natural properties.  
For that reason, the Christological proposal of Ḥenanā that Christ is one 
person (parṣōpā), one hypostasis (qnōmā) and two natures (kyānē)16 was 
                                                            
13) Cf. BAUM & WINKLER, The Church, p. 39. 
14) This work was edited and translated into Latin by VASCHALDE, Babai Magni. 
15) The Christological controversy within the Church of East did not end with the as-
sembly of 612. On this see our article, Bishara EBEID, “La cristologia del catholicos Mar 
Georgis I. Un‟analisi della sua lettera a Mina”, in Rafal ZARZECZNY (ed.), Aethiopia Fortitudo 
Ejus. Studi in onore di Monsignor Osvaldo Raineri in occasione del suo 80° compleanno 
(OCA 298), Pontificio Istituto Orientale, Roma, 2015, pp. 203-220; see also Bishara EBEID, 
“Christology and Deification in the Church of the East. Mar Gewargis I, His Synod and His 
Letter to Mina as a Polemic against Martyrius-Sahdona” in Cristianesimo nella Storia (Stud-
ies in History, Theology and Exegesis) 38:3 (2017), pp. 729-784. 
16) Cf. CHILDERS, “Ḥenana”, p. 194. 
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seen as dangerous to some of the theologians and thinkers of the Church of 
the East. In fact, they tried to conserve their different Christological identity 
from the Chalcedonians and the non-Chalcedonians (Jacobites)
17
.  
Babai, against such voices as the one of Ḥenanā, wrote his “Book of the 
Union”, and was one of the important theologians of the Church of the East 
to develop systematically the Trinitarian and Christological doctrine of his 
church, according to his point of view. He actually defined the technical and 
metaphysical terms used in these doctrines, giving them a clear explanation 
and a precise metaphysical role and use18.  
There is no doubt that the concept of nature (kyānā) was not a topic of 
discussion since there was already an agreement on its definition that it was 
the general and common substance (itūtā/usiā)19. The problem, however, 
was regarding the definition of the terms hypostasis (qnōmā) and person 
(parṣōpā), their relation to the common nature (kyānā), and the one between 
each other. 
According to Babai, a singular substance (usiā/οὐζία) is called: 
hypostasis (qnōmā), consisting in its sin-
gle essence [expressed] by the number 
„one‟. And it is distinct from the „many‟ 
[hypostases], not because of the fact that 
it became singular, but since it receives, 
in the created, rational and free beings, 
various accidents of virtue of abundance 
or of poverty, of knowledge or of igno-
rance; and in the irrational beings re-
ceives also various accidents, either by 
opposed temperaments or in any other 
way. And these [the accidents], as I said, 
are not creators, they are only created 
[things]. Hypostasis is fixed according to 
its nature and it is subject to the species 
and the nature of which it is hypostasis, 
together with the similar hypostases to it 
[i.e. of the same nature]. It is distin-
guished from these similar and equal hy-
 ܥܝܪܣ ܇ܗܣܮܬܣ ܐܮܝܕܝܛܝ ܐܝܩܘܐ ܐܣܘܧܩ
 ܨܣ ܭܝܪܦܘ ܇ܕܚܕ ܘ̇ܗ ܐܧܝܧܤܒ ܐܮܝܕܘܛܠ ܗܮܝܒ
 ܢܒܪܣ ܦܐܘ ܠܐܐ ܕ ̣̇ܝ ̣̇ܛܣܕ ܝ̇ܗܒ ܘܠ ܇ܐܐ̈ܝܔܩ
ܝܐ ܬܘܠ ܝܮܣܐ ܮܝܐ ܐܕܝ̈ܒܥ ܢܘܗܝܮܝܐܕ ܨܝܡ
 ܘܐ ܐܦܡ̈ܛܬܣ ܐ̈ܫܕܓ ܇ܐܝܪ̈ܐܚܘ ܠܐܝܡ̈ܣܘ
 ܘܐ ܐܮܥܕܝܕ ܘܐ ܐܬܘܬܝܒܕ ܘܐ ܐܬܘܪܮܝܣܕ
 ܦܐ ܇ܨܝܕ ܠܐܝܡ̈ܣ ܠܐ ܬܘܠ .ܐܮܥܕܝ ܠܐܕ
 ܐܓܙ̈ܘܤܒ ܘܐ .ܐܦܡ̈ܛܫܘ ܐ̈ܫܕܓ ܐܟܪܗ
 ܨܝܠ̇ܗܘ .ܘ̣ܗܕ ܐܦܙ ܐܧܝܐܒ ܘܐ ܐܬܘܝܡܒ̈ܘܪܠܕܕ
 .ܕܘܛܡܒ ܐܕ̈ܝܒܥܘ ܐܝܪ̈ܒ ܘܠ ܬܪ̇ܣܐܕ ܟܝܐ
ܚܬܘ ܗܬܘܝܧܝܟܒ ܘܗ ܐܥܝܒܩ ܪܝܓ ܐܣܘܧܩ ܮܝ
 ܐܧܝܧܣ ܥܥ ܐܣܘܧܩ ܘܗ ܗܡܝܕܕ ܐܧܝܟܘ ܐܫܕܐ
 .ܝܗܘܪ̈ܒܚ ܐ̈ܣܘܧܩ ܨܣ ̣ܘܬܝܪܦܘ .ܭܝܒܚ ܝܗܘܘܪ̈ܒܚ
ܐܦܘܨܪܦܒ ܐܧܩܕ ܐܮܝܕܝܛܝ ܐܮܝܡܝܕܒ. 
 .ܣܪܞܦ ܘܠ ܣܘܠܘܦܘ .ܢܝܐܟܝܣܕ ܘܠ ܢܝܪܒܓܕ
 ܐܧܝܟ ܗܡܟ ܐ̈ܣܘܧܩ ܨܣ ܕܚ ܕܚ ܢܟܒ ܨܝܕ ܡܪܒ
 ܐ̈ܣܘܧܪܠ ܭ̇ܒܚܕ ܐܧܝܟ ܕܚܘ .ܥܕܝܮܣ ܐܝܦܘܓ
 ܢܐ .ܘܧܝܐܕ ܥܕܝܮܣ ܐܧܝܥܪܒ ܐܘܔܒ
                                                            
17) Cf. BAUM & WINKLER, The Church, pp. 35-41; see EBEID, “The Christology”, pp. 
377, 389-390, 394-395. 
18) Cf. BAUM & WINKLER, The Church, p. 38. 
19) Cf. PATROS, “La cristologia”, pp. 28-29. 
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postases through the singular property 
which possesses by its person (parsōpā). 
For example, Gabriel is not Michael and 
Paul is not Peter. But in each hypostasis 
(qnōmā) [of them] the entire common na-
ture is known, and [with regard to] the 
one nature that comprises the hypostases 
(qnōmē) in a common way, it is known 
through the mind what [sort of nature] it 
is, whether it is the nature of men or of 
other things. The hypostasis (qnōmā), 
however, does not comprise [all] the 
common [being]20. 
ܘ ܐܬ̈ܧܝܧܒܕ ܨܝܕ ܐܣܘܧܩ .ܐܦܪ̈ܚܐܕ ܐܟܪܫܕ ܢܐ
ܐܘܔܠ ܭ̇ܒܚ ܠܐ21.21  
 
Babai‟s definition of hypostasis (qnōmā) seems to be close to the one 
that Aristotle gave for the primary substance, but we should not arrive at 
such a conclusion without first analyzing carefully Babai‟s full definition. 
Qnōmā is a singular substance (ܐܮܐܝܕܝܛܝ ܐܐܝܩܘܐ). Being singular means that 
it subsists by itself. Numerically it is one. It belongs to a distinct species, 
which is the common nature (ܐܐܝܦܘܓ ܐܧܝܟ). It is one among many hypostases 
(qnōmē) that belong to the same common substance. All these qnōmē are 
equal and identical in everything related to the common nature they manifest 
perfectly. The qnōmā, however, is not identified with the common nature, 
since the latter comprises all of the singular substances subject to it. Qnōmā is 
also a perfect singular nature, manifesting this nature perfectly, i.e., the natu-
ral properties of one specific species, but is not the entire common being 
(ܐܘܔܠ ܭ̇ܒܚ ܠܐ ܨܝܕ ܐܣܘܧܩ).  
Qnōmā, being a singular nature, is fixed naturally, i.e., it cannot change 
to another species or another common nature; it cannot form a new reality 
with another qnōmā, or a new hypostasis (qnōmā) of new species. Qnōmā 
can receive various accidents, and these distinguish one hypostasis (qnōmā) 
from another one of the same common nature. It is the group of singular 
properties possessed by one qnōmā that constitutes, according to Babai, a 
person (parṣōpā). To be clearer, Babai gives an example: Gabriel and Mi-
chael, Paul and Peter are all human qnōmē, i.e., singular human natures. 
They are similar according to their natural properties, but Gabriel is not Mi-
chael because of the different personal properties of each qnōmā. This, in 
fact, is the metaphysical function of person (parṣōpā) according to Babai‟s 
                                                            
20) The translation is ours. 
21) VASCHALDE, Babai Magni, pp. 159-160. 
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thought. Gabriel and Michael, Paul and Peter are qnōmē, but also are 
parṣōpē. In the following citation, Babai further explains his system: 
The person (parṣōpā) is the property of any 
[possible] hypostasis, which distinguishes it 
from other [hypostases], because the hypos-
tasis of Paul is not the hypostasis of Peter. 
Although they [i.e. Paul and Peter or any oth-
er humans] are equal in nature and hypostasis 
–for each of them possesses a body and a 
soul, they is living, and rational and corpore-
al– nevertheless in person they are distinct 
from each other, either in age, appearance, 
health, wisdom, power, paternity, filiation, 
being male or female, or any other way that 
distinguishes and manifests the singular and 
individual property. [As a consequence], this 
one is not that one, nor is those these. Alt-
hough in nature they are identical, [neverthe-
less] in the [domain] of the singular property 
that this hypostasis possesses, which is not 
that one, it is the person that makes the dis-
tinction22. 
ܝܗܘܮܝܐ ܦܐ ܨܝܕ ܐܦܘܨܪܦ  ܗܮܝܡܝܕ
 .ܐܦܪ̈ܚܐ ܨܣ ܗܠ ܫܪܦܕ ܘ̣ܗܕ ܐܧܝܐ ܐܣܘܧܩܕ
 ܘ̇ܗ ܝܗܘܮܝܐ ܠܐ ܣܘܠܘܦܕ ܗܣܘܧܩܕ ܝ̇ܗܒ
 ܨܝܘܫ ܐܣܘܧܩܘ ܐܧܝܟܕ ܝ̇ܗܒ ܨܦܐ ܇ܣܘܪܞܦܕ
 ܐܬܦܦܘ ܐܪܔܦ ܢܘܗܧܣ ܕܛܡܟܕ ܝ̇ܗܒ .ܢܘܦܐ
 ܇ܐܝܪܔܦܘ ܠܐܝܡܣܘ ܝܗܘܮܝ̣ܐ ܐܝܚܘ ܇ܐܧܩ
 .ܢܘܗܧܣ ܕܚ ܢܘܦܐ ܨܝܬܝܪܦ ܐܦܘܨܪܦܒ ܠܐܐ
 ܘܐ ܇ܐܤܝܟܩܐܒ ܘܐ ܇ܐܤܩܐܒ ܘܐ
܇ܐܮܤܟܛܒ ܘܐ ܇ܐܓܙܘܤܒ ܬܒ ܘܐܘ ܇ܐܧܞܠ
 ܘܐ ܇ܐܬܘܪܒܒ ܘܐ ܇ܐܬܘܗܒܐܒ ܘܐ
 ܘ̣ܗܕ ܐܧܝܐܒ ܘܐ ܇ܐܬܘܒܪܧܒ ܘܐ ܇ܐܬܘܪܟܕܒ
 ܐܮܝܕܘܛܠ ܐܮܝܡܝܕ ܐܘܛܣܘ ܫܪܦܣܕ .ܐܦܙ
 ܇ܐܦܗ ܘܠ ܘ̇ܗܘ ܇ܘ̇ܗ ܘܠ ܐܦܗܕ ܇ܐܮܝܕܝܛܝܘ
 ܐܬܘܝܡܝܕܕ ܝ̇ܗܒ ܇ܢܘܦܐ ܨܝܘܫ ܐܧܝܟܒ ܨܦܐ
 ܝܗܘܮܝܐ ܘܠܕ ܇ܐܣܘܧܩ ܐܦܗ ܐܧܩܕ ܐܮܝܕܝܛܝ
ܫܪܦܕ ܘܗ ܐܦܘܨܪܦ .ܘ̇ܗ23 .23 
In this definition we should notice that for Babai, the qnōmā has two 
kinds of properties and characteristics, the natural and the proper. By the 
natural, it is recognized to which common being it belongs. By the individu-
al, it is distinguished from the other hypostases (qnōmē) of the same species 
and general substance. In our opinion, for Babai, the qnōmā by itself, being a 
singular and concrete substance of a general nature, is a perfect manifesta-
tion of the natural properties of this species, however, to be recognized as 
individuality, i.e., a particular reality, it receives a person (parṣōpā), that is, a 
group of individual properties. One can notice that for our thinker, the gen-
eral nature, in fact, does not exist. It is an abstract reality, while the concrete 
one is the subsistent reality, the singular and concrete substance, the qnōmā. 
However, this subsistent reality cannot be complete without the individual 
properties, which is the person that each qnōmā possesses. The person of one 
hypostasis, i.e., reality composed by qnōmā and parṣōpā, in conclusion, is a 
concrete, perfect and complete singular nature recognized so by its natural 
(qnōmā), and personal (parṣōpā) properties24.  
                                                            
22) The translation is ours. 
23) VASCHALDE, Babai Magni, p. 160. 
24) For more details regarding Babai‟s thought and doctrine of these terms see SCIPIONI, 
Ricerche, pp. 110-112; ABRAMOWSKI, “Babai”, pp. 297-314. 
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Making this analysis we can, in fact, notice that Babai is developing his 
metaphysical system, having as its basis, not only the philosophy of stoicism 
regarding the categories of “κοινῶς ποιός” and “ἰδίφς ποιόν”, as Scipioni 
sustained25, but also the Aristotelian concept of substance “οὑζία”, the pri-
mary and the secondary. In our opinion, it is an elaboration and development 
of what we already find in Gregory of Nyssa‟s metaphysical system, i.e., the 
concept of the “partial substance” (μερικὴ οὐζία) or “particular substance” 
(ἰδικὴ οὐζία)26. It is not our purpose to enter into detail regarding the doc-
trine of Gregory of Nyssa or the other Cappadocians27, but we think that Ba-
bai had as a basis an existing elaboration of that metaphysical system, al-
ready in use by other Antiochene thinkers and theologians28. However, Babai 
gave it a new dimension, which we may call “Nestorian”.  
According to the elaborated system that Babai had as a basis, we can 
say that the secondary substance is the common and general, the universal. It 
is an abstract nature, while the primary substance is the singular nature with 
the individual properties. It is the common nature which takes an existence 
in individuals. There is, however, another status or category of substance, the 
partial one, which is an intermediate status between the abstract reality 
(common and general) and the concrete one (individual and singular).  
Babai applied the terminology he had to this metaphysical system. For 
the general and common, i.e., the secondary substance and the “κοινῶς 
ποιός”, he used “substance” (ܐܐܐܝܩܘܐ), “nature” (ܐܐܐܧܝܟ), and “essence” 
(ܐܬܘܮܐܝܐ). This category is the group of the natural properties of one spe-
cies, it is an abstract reality. When this abstract reality comes into existence 
and is distinct numerically, it is called hypostasis (ܐܐܣܘܧܩ). The singular sub-
stance is one of many that are subject to one specific species and common 
                                                            
25) Cf. SCIPIONI, Ricerche, pp. 136-137. 
26) Cf. TURCESCU, Gregory, pp. 26-38, especially pp. 37-38, and pp. 69-71. 
27) In addition to the reference in the previous footnote, see also KARIATLIS, “St Bas-
il‟s”, pp. 57-83; TURCESCU, “Prosopon”, pp. 374-395; HILDEBRAND, The Trinitarian. 
28) We think, as Scipioni demonstrated, that Nestorius‟ Liber Heraclides, including 
Pseudo-Nestorius, used such a system, cf. SCIPIONI, Ricerche, pp. 98-158, 153-158. Regarding 
the Antiochene background of Babai, see ABRAMOWSKI, “Babai”, pp. 328-341. In addition, 
in our view, Leontius of Byzantium, who had an Anthiochene education and formation, used a 
similar system and applied it to the Chalcedonian Christology. Regarding his system, see 
KRAUSMÜLLER, Dirk, “Making Sense of the Formula of Chalcedon. The Cappadocians and 
Aristotle in Leontius of Byzantium‟s Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos”, in Vigiliae Christi-
anae 65 (2011), pp. 484-513.We are, in fact, planning to further investigate this topic in order 
to demonstrate the common Antiochene metaphysical system of both Babai and Leontius. The 
former gave it a “Nestorian” dimension while the latter gave it a Chalcedonian dimension. 
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nature. In our opinion, the qnōmā in Babai‟s thought is the singular nature 
without individual properties, yet it is not a complete and perfect individual, 
even if it is singular and perfectly manifests the natural properties, that is, the 
partial nature in an intermediate status. When, however, this partial nature 
receives personal and individual properties through various accidents, it be-
comes a person (ܐܐܦܘܨܪܦ), i.e., an individual. So when a qnōmā receives its 
parṣōpā, this means that it receives its individualization, its personalization. 
For this reason, in our opinion, Babai calls it “the parṣōpā of the qnōmā”, as 
the first quotation of the next section demonstrates.  
2. Babai the Great‟s Trinitarian doctrine  
In his metaphysical system which we just presented, it is clear that Ba-
bai is making a very significant development, differentiating it from the tra-
ditional Cappadocian metaphysical system. In fact, this will become clear as 
we see how our thinker applies this system to his Trinitarian doctrine: 
Three are the adorable hypostases 
(qnōmē) of the eternal Trinity identical in 
everything: in one glorious essence 
(ītūtā), cause of all creatures. However, if 
you want to distinguish through reason 
the one [hypostasis] from the other, you 
cannot [do it], except through the property 
of their persons (parṣōpē). The name „Fa-
ther‟ is, in fact, the person (parṣōpā) of 
his hypostasis [qnōmā]: He is unbegotten; 
from whom the Son, already since eterni-
ty, was begotten. And [the Son] is distinct 
through the person (parṣōpā) of his hy-
postasis, so He is neither the Father nor 
the Holy Spirit, but the begotten from the 
Father before the ages. And so we distin-
guish the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit 
through its singular person (parṣōpā) that 
He possesses, for He is from the Father 
since eternity, that is, from the nature of 
Him through the way of the procession, so 
He is neither the Father nor the Son. This 
means that these [hypostases] are distinct 
through the distinct persons (parṣōpē) 
they own through their properties. These 
adorable persons (parṣōpē) can be given 
 ܐܕ̈ܝܔܩ ܐ̈ܣܘܧܩ ܪܝܓ ܢܘܦܐ ܐܮܠܬ
 ܐܕܛܒ ܢܟܒ ܮܝܘܫ ܐܮܝܣܘܮܣ ܐܬܘܝܮܝܠܬܕ
 ܡܪܒ .ܨܝܪ̈ܒ ܢܟܕ ܐܮܡܥܘ ܐܮܛܝܒܫ ܐܬܘܮܝܐ
 ܮܦܐ ܐܥܒ ܢܐ ܨܝܕܪ ܢܘܦܐ ܫܘܪܦܬܕ ܮܝܐܧܝܥ
 ܢܐ ܠܐܐ ܇ܮܦܐ ܜܟܬܣ ܠܐ ܇ܐ̈ܕܕܚ ܨܣ
ܪ̈ܦܕ ܐܬܘܝܡܝܕܒ ܇ܪܝܓ ܐܒܐ ܥܫ .ܢܘܗܝܦܘܨ
 .ܐܕܝܡܝ ܠܐ ܝܗܘܮܝܐ ܗܣܘܧܩܕ ܘܗ ܐܦܘܨܪܦ
ܪܦܘ .ܕܝܡܝ ܮܝܐܣܘܮܣ ܐܪܒ ܗܧܣܕܝ ܭ
 ܠܐܦܐܘ .ܘܗ ܐܒܐ ܘܠܕ .ܗܣܘܧܩܕ ܐܦܘܨܪܦܒ
 ܢܟܠ ܕܡܝܬܐ ܐܒܐ ܨܣ ܠܐܐ .ܐܫܕܘܩܕ ܐܚܘܪ
 ܐܚܘܪܕ ܐܣܘܧܪܠ ܦܐ ܐܧܟܗ .ܝܮܣܐ ܨܣ
 ܐܝܧܡܝܕ ܐܦܘܨܪܦܒ ܗܠ ܨܧܝܫܪܦ ܐܫܕܘܩܕ
 ܮܝܐܣܘܮܣ ܐܒܐ ܨܣܕ ܐܧܩܕ ܐܝܕܝܛܝܘ
ܘܦ̇ܗ .ܝܗܘܮܝܐ  ܐܬܘܩܘܦܦܕ ܗܦܙܒ ܗܧܝܟ ܨܣ ܨܝܕ
 ܢܘܦܗ ܢܝܟܣܘ .ܐܪܒ ܘܠܘ ܘܗ ܐܒܐ ܘܠܕܘ
 ܇ܢܘܗܮ̈ܝܡܝܕܒ ܨܝܧܩܕ ܐܬܝܪ̈ܦ ܐܦܘܨܪ̈ܦܒ ܨܝܠܗ
 ܨܝܒܗܝܮܣ ܇ܐ̈ܕܝܔܩ ܐܦܘܨܪ̈ܦ ܨܝܠܗ ܢܘܦ̣ܗ
 ܠܐܘ ܨܝܒܗܝܮܣ ܠܐ ܨܝܕ ܐ̈ܣܘܧܩ .ܨܝܒܪܦܮܣܘ
 ܐܣܘܧܩ ܐܦܗ ܒܪܦܮܣ ܠܐܕ ܝ̇ܗܒ .ܨܝܒܪܦܮܣ
 ܇ܐܣܘܧܩ ܕܚ ܐܦܪܚܐ ܐܣܘܧܩ ܥܥ ܐܘܗܦܕ
 ܠܐܐ .ܐܛܟܬܣ ܠܐ ܪܝܓ ܐܕܗ ܡܕܣ ܘ̇ܗ
 ܐܣܘܧܩ ܕܚ ܐܦܗܠ ܗܠ ܝܗܘܮܝܐ ܮܝܐܥܝܒܩܕ
 ܇ܐܦܪܚܐ ܐܣܘܧܩ ܘ̇ܗ ܝܗܘܮܝܠܕ ܫܪܦܮܣ ܗܒܕ
 ܐܚܘܪ ܠܐ ܐܪܒܘ .ܐܪܒ ܘܠ ܐܒܐܕ ܨܝܕ ܘܦ̇ܗ
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and received; the hypostases (qnōmē), on 
the contrary, can neither be given nor re-
ceived. Because of the fact that this hy-
postasis (qnōmā) cannot be received, to 
become one hypostasis with another [dif-
ferent] hypostasis is impossible. But what 
inheres permanently in one hypostasis 
(qnōmā) is the thing by which it is distin-
guished, so that is not another hypostasis, 
i.e., the Father is not the Son and the Son 
is not the Holy Spirit. These names, as 
they are persons, not in the [domain of 
hypostases, can be given and received. 
The hypostasis (qnōmā), however, shows 
only that this is this and not that. [For ex-
ample], when two men come forward us, 
iy is known that they are two hypostases, 
but it is not yet known who is the one and 
who is the other, i.e., yet the property of 
the hypostasis (qnōmā) is not manifested 
as person (parṣōpā)29. 
 ܢܞܣ ܐ̈ܗܤܫ ܢܝܟܗ ܨܝܠܗ .ܐܫܕܘܩܕ
 ܐ̈ܣܘܧܩܕ ܝ̇ܗܒ ܘܠ ܇ܢܘܦܐ ܐܦܘܨܪ̈ܦܕ
 ܐܕܗ ܨܝܕ ܐܣܘܧܩ .ܨܝܒܪܦܮܣܘ ܨܝܒܗܝܮܣ
 ܐܦܙܟܐ .ܘ̇ܗ ܠܐ ܐܦܗܕ ܇ܐܘܛܣ ܕܘܛܡܒ
܇ܠܗܠ ܨ̈ܝܬܦܐ ܨܝܪܬ ܨܝܬ̇ܐܕ  ܐ̈ܣܘܧܩ ܨܝܪܬܕ
ܕܝ ܢܘܦܐܥܝ ܠܐ ܐܦܗܘ ܘ̇ܗ ܨܝܕ ܘܧܝܐܕ .ܨܝ
 ܐܣܘܧܩܕ ܗܮܝܡܝܕ ܪܝܓ ܘܠ .ܢܝܟܕܥ ܨܝܥܝܕܝ
ܐܦܘܨܪܦ ܟܝܐ ܐܘܛܣ30.30 
In his Trinitarian doctrine, it is notable that Babai, on the one hand, tries 
to be faithful to the Cappadocian tradition and his church‟s doctrine, and on 
the other hand, he succeeds in applying the Cappadocian doctrine to his own 
system. Without going into much detail, for the Cappadocians, ὐπόζηαζις, 
which is somehow synonymous to πρόζφπον, is the result of the common 
nature with an idiom (ἰδίφμα), that is, a property. For example, the Son is the 
divine common nature with the idiom of the generation, so he is the begotten 
Son. For the Cappadocians, the general nature and the idiom make the hy-
postasis, and at the same time, the idioms also reveal the relation (ζτέζις) 
between the hypostases of the divine nature. Being the Son generated from 
the Father and the Spirit proceeding from the Father makes the latter to be 
the cause of the Trinity31. 
Also, for Babai, the Father is the cause of the Son and the Spirit. The 
Father as qnōmā, i.e., divine concrete and singular substance with his own 
property of his person (parṣōpā), is the cause of the Son and the Holy Spirit, 
                                                            
29) The translation is ours. 
30) VASCHALDE, Babai Magni, pp. 160-161. 
31) Cf. HILDEBRAND, The Trinitarian, pp. 82-92, especially pp. 91-92, and pp. 92-98, 
see also KARIATLIS, “St Basil‟s”, pp. 67-68. 
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two qnōmē with their parṣōpē. It is not the general nature with the property 
or the idiom that make the hypostasis, as it is for the Cappadocians, but it is 
the hypostasis (qnōmā), as concrete singular substance of a general nature, 
with the property that make the person (parṣōpā). It is clear that qnōmā and 
parṣōpā are two different metaphysical concepts with different functions. In 
these last affirmations we notice not only the differentiation between Babai 
and the Cappadocians, but also that for Babai there is a difference between 
idiom, and property (ܐܮܝܡܝܕ), and person (ܐܦܘܨܪܦ).  
It may be argued that the parṣōpā manifests the personal properties of 
one qnōmā. One can also observe, however, that sometimes the difference 
between these two concepts is blurred. The clearest example of this is the 
explanation that Babai gives regarding the names. For him, the names “Fa-
ther”, “Son”, and “Holy Spirit” are the persons, and at the same time they are 
the individual properties of the qnōmē. For this reason, he affirms that “the 
name „Father‟ is the person (parṣōpā) of his hypostasis” ( ܐܐܒܐ ܥܐܫ  ܇ܪܐܝܓ
ܗܣܘܐܧܩܕ ܘܗ ܐܐܦܘܨܪܦ). We can explain it also by the following: the person 
(parṣopā) is called “Son” since his qnōmā received the property of sonship, 
i.e., being generated from the Father. This means that the parṣōpā is an idi-
om of the qnōmā. We can also say that the name of one parṣōpā indicates 
the property of its qnōmā, and is consequently its personal property. 
To make all of this more comprehensible, we will use the following 
schemes: 
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3. Babai the Great‟s Christological approach 
Babai was not interested in developing his metaphysical system for the 
purpose of explaining the Trinitarian doctrine. For him, the Christological 
dogma was the most important issue. His system helped him to support the 
doctrine regarding the two natures and two hypostases in Christ united in 
one person. He said, in fact, as we have seen above, that the qnōmā is fixed 
and cannot be received or given, while the parṣōpā can be received or given. 
By this, he is trying to prepare the way for his Christological doctrine: the 
parṣōpā of the Son was given to the human qnōmā of Christ, and so this 
human qnōmā received or acquired its personalization; and in this parṣōpā 
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stances; each one perfectly manifests 
the common substance, that is, its nat-
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parṣōpā of the Father. The parṣōpā of 
the Son is a divine qnōmā with the 
property of generation, while the one 
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with the property of procession. 
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The Father is the cause of the Trinity. 
The Son and the Holy Spirit are per-
fect divine qnōmē from the perfect 
divine qnōmā of the Father. They are 
recognized by their parṣōpē because of 
their relation with the Father, i.e., their 
personal property that comes from 
their relation with their cause.  
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the union was realized. We have, as a consequence, one person of Christ, 
which is a common parṣōpā of two qnōmē32. 
This system was adopted partially by the synod of 612. That assembly 
of bishops considered the doctrine regarding the two qnōmē in Christ to be 
orthodox. Regarding the Trinitarian dogma, however, and the use of Babai‟s 
system in the Trinitarian field, especially applying the concept of parṣōpā, it 
was not officially accepted33. This is probably because there was either a 
danger of it being understood as tritheism, or simply that at the time, the 
problem was not Trinitarian but Christological.  
With the arrival of Islam in the Near East, the Trinitarian dogma took its 
place once again within theological discussions, but this time between Chris-
tians and Muslims. For the latter, actually, this dogma meant polytheism. 
The Christians felt the necessity to re-produce apologetic works in order to 
cope with this new situation34. Babai‟s system was not utilized in the Trini-
tarian field during his time because there was no need for it. However, Ibn 
aṭ-Ṭayyib, in the new Islamic milieu, tried to explain the Trinitarian dogma 
to Muslims by further developing Babai‟s system, while keeping in mind 
that it was not officially accepted by his church. 
B. IBN AṬ-ṬAYYIB AND HIS DOCTRINE 
We do not have much biographical information regarding Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib‟s date of birth. Scholars, however, claim that it was in the last quarter 
of the 10th century35. Regarding the date of his death, the Jacobite Barhe-
braeus (†1286) states that Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib died on October of the year 1043. 
                                                            
32) Regarding the Christology of Babai, see SCIPIONI, Ricerche, pp. 112-116, 118-130, 
138-148; ABRAMOWSKI, “Babai”, pp. 297-314; Luise ABRAMOWSKI, “Die Christologie Ba-
bais des Grossen”, in Symposium Syriacum I (OCA 197), Pontificio Istituto Orientale, Roma 
1972, pp. 219-244; Marijke METSELAAR, “The Mirror, the Qnoma, and the Soul: Another Per-
spective on the Christological Formula of Babai the Great”, in Zeitschrift für Antikes Chris-
tentum 19 (2015), pp. 331-366. 
33) Cf. CHABOT, Synodicon, pp. 564-567 (for the Trinitarian and Christological doc-
trine), pp. 583-584 (regarding the orthodoxy of this doctrine), see also BAUM & WINKLER, The 
Church, p. 39.  
34) A very good reference on this remains the book of Sidney GRIFFITH, The Church in 
the Shadow of the Mosque. Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam, Princeton Universi-
ty Press, Princeton-Oxford, 2008, especially pp. 1-11, 23-105. See also HADDAD, La Trinité, 
pp. 25-26. 
35) For more details on his life, see FAULTLESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, pp. 667-674; GRAF, 
GCAL, vol. II, pp. 160-162. 
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He is one of the most important “Nestorian” thinkers of his time, and maybe 
the most important and greatest polymath of the Church of the East. He was 
a physician, philosopher and theologian; he wrote many works on medicine, 
commentaries on most of the works of Aristotle, Galen and Hippocrates, ex-
egetical works on most of the books of Holy Scripture and dogmatic treatis-
es, especially regarding Trinitarian dogma. Being a polymath and a great 
theologian afforded him the position of secretary to two Catholicoi of the 
Church of the East: Yūḥannā VII (1012-1020 or 1013-1022) and Elias I 
(1028-1049). Having taken the responsibility of approving the dogmatic 
works of “Nestorian” authors and theologians of his time, such as Elias of 
Nisibis, means that he was considered a theologian and teacher of the 
Church of the East in that period.  
Samir Khalil Samir also demonstrated in his article, “La place d‟Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib dans la pensée arabe”, the importance of our author among the Arab 
thinkers and philosophers, both Muslim and Christian. The different citations 
that Samir uses confirm all that we have mentioned previously regarding the 
position of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as an Aristotelian philosopher and commentator, 
and as a theologian and approver of theological works36. The fact that some 
of his works are cited by the encyclopedia “Mağmūʻ uṣūl al-dīn – Summa of 
the principles of religion”37 of the Coptic theologian al-Mu'taman Ibn al-
ʻAssāl († after 1265)38, proves that his doctrine was admired by authors of 
other Christian confessions and was greatly useful to them, even if he be-
longed to a “heretical” church according to their beliefs39. 
He is also considered to be the last Christian Aristotelian teacher work-
ing in Baghdad40. In his exegesis, he follows the Antiochene School, espe-
cially, the thought of Theodore of Mopsuestia, John Chrysostom, Ephraim 
the Syrian and others41. Scholars note that he explains the Trinitarian dogma 
                                                            
36) Cf. Samir Kh. SAMIR, “La place d‟Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib dans la pensée arabe”, in Journal of 
Eastern Christian Studies 58 (2006), pp. 177-193. 
37) There is a critical edition of this work with Italian translation see al-Mu'taman Ibn 
al-ʻAssāl, Summa.  
38) Cf. FAULTLESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, p. 671. 
39) Some of his works, such as his commentary on the prologue to John, when copied 
by non-Nestorians received some changes in their content because of the Christological disa-
greements between them. For more on this, FAULTLESS, “The two Recensions”, pp. 177-198. 
See also HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 73. 
40) Cf. FAULTLESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, p. 668. 
41) Cf. FAULTLESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, p. 669, regarding his exegesis see the following ar-
ticles: Paul FÉGHALI, “Ibn Aṭ-Ṭayyib et son commentaire sur la Genèse”, in ParOr 16 (1990-
1991), pp. 149-162; Floris SEPMEIJER, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib‟s Commentary on Mathew 1-9: 32-34”, 
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to Muslims without mentioning their names, using Aristotelian philosophy 
and the discussion on the attributes of God42. Our objective here is to present 
his Trinitarian doctrine and to demonstrate that he was a disciple, maybe in-
directly, of Babai‟s philosophical system. In our opinion, he elaborated such 
system and used it in his doctrine, taking into consideration the new condi-
tions of the Christians of that period and region: the Arabic language and the 
Islamic general context.  
To accomplish this, we will use the following edited works43 of Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib44:  
a. Treatise on the Trinity (Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ)45. 
b. Treatise on the Trinity and Unity (Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ wa-t-tawḥīd)46. 
c. Discourse on the Union (al-Kalām fī al-ittiḥād)47. 
d. Work in fourteen chapters (Arabic title is unknown)48.  
e. Treatise on the Union (Kitāb al-ittiḥād)49. 
1. Terminology and metaphysical definitions 
Before we look at or examine the Trinitarian doctrine of our author, we 
should present two of his quotations that illustrate his metaphysical system, 
which is based on Babai‟s system as will be made clear by our analysis: 
                                                                                                                                           
in ParOr 25 (2000), pp. 557-564. See also FAULTLESS, “The two Recensions”. 
42) Cf. FAULTLESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, p. 670. 
43) We follow the English titles suggested by FAULTLESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, pp. 674-697. 
In the same pages, there is a list of the works of Ibn al-Ṭayyib related to the Muslim-Christian 
dialogue. Another list of his works is offered in GRAF, GCAL, vol. II, pp. 162-177. 
44) Unfortunately we do not have complete critical editions of all the works of Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib. Although we have editions of some works, they are not always critical, but based on 
just one manuscript. For this reason and in order to have a clearer image of his thought, we 
need a complete critical edition of all the works attributed to him. These critical editions 
would ensure the authenticity of his works and might also resolve other important issues re-
garding his doctrine. 
45) There is an edition with a French translation: Ibn al-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ, pp. 
74-89. 
46) There is an edition with a French translation: Ibn al-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ wa-
t-tawḥīd, pp. 108-123. 
47) There is an edition with a French translation: Ibn al-Ṭayyib, al-Kalām fī al-ittiḥād, 
pp. 144-150. 
48) This work came to us by way of the citation provided by al-Mu'taman ibn al-ʻAssāl: 
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, pp. 275- 277 (ch. 11, par. 92-101); pp. 409-416 (ch. 
19, par. 28-51). 
49) This work came to us only partially, since it is quoted by al-Mu'taman Ibn al-ʻAssāl: 
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Kitāb al-ittiḥād, pp. 77-78 (ch. 8, par. 126-255). 
110 BISHARA  EBEID 
The terms used by Christians regarding the 
essence (ḏāt) of the Creator (Glorified and Ex-
alted Be He!), are: substance (ğawhar), hypos-
tasis (uqnūm), person (farsūf)50, unity (tawḥīd), 
trinity (taṯlīṯ), attributes (ṣifāt) and union 
(ittiḥād).  
The term substance (ğawhar) in every essence 
(ḏāt) indicates the absolute nature (muṭlaq aṭ-
ṭabā'iʻ) in the thing, such as the nature of the 
human being (al-insān) in his persons 
(ašḫāṣihi) and the fire in its persons 
(ašḫāṣihā). If [the essence] becomes particular 
(taḫaṣṣaṣat), through the specification, you 
name it hypostasis (uqnūm), and if the attribute 
[of the hypostasis] becomes specific 
(taʻayyanat), you name it [the essence] person 
(farṣūf wa šaḫṣ). When [the essence] obtains a 
multitude of descriptions [i.e. attributes], ac-
cording to one side, it may be considered one, 
and according to another, many: It is one, from 
the side of the substance (ğawhar), it is, [how-
ever], many, from the side of its descriptions 
[i.e., attributes]
51
. 
 ئرابلا تاذ في ،ىراصنلا دنع ةلمعتسلدا ءاسملأا
 ،مونقأو ،رىوج :ةظفل يى )لىاعتو وناحبس(
.دا حتّاو ،تافصو ،ثيلثتو ،ديحوتو ،فوصرفو 
 
 قلطم ىلع لدي ،تاذ لك في ،رىولجا مساف
 في قلطلدا ناسنلإا عبطك ،ءيشلا في عابطلا
 اذإف .وصاخشأ في ةقلطلدا رانلاو ،وصاخشأ
يسم ةفصب تصحصتخ اذإو ،اًمونقأ صيصختلبا اهت
 اذإو .اًصخشو اًفوصرف اهتيسم ةفصلا تنحيعت
  وجوبو ،اًدحاو وجوب تناك فاصولأا الذ تلحصتّ
انهإف ،ًانًثك  نمو ،اًدحاو نوكت رىولجا ةهج نم
ةنًثك نوكت اهفاصوأ ةهج52.52 
 
  
It is notable that for Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, the substance (ğawhar) is an abstract 
essence (ḏāt) and reality. This is the meaning, in fact, behind the expression, 
“the absolute nature in the thing”. It is the common nature of the persons 
(ašḫāṣ) of the same essence, and it indicates its species. This abstract reality 
obtains its existence when it becomes particular (taḫaṣṣaṣa). Becoming par-
ticular means for our author that the essence obtains an attribute. We think 
that he means that it manifests its natural properties, and in this case it could 
be called hypostasis (uqnūm). In our opinion, we have a kind of identifica-
tion between the natural properties and the hypostasis. It means that the hy-
postasis is the perfect manifestation of the natural properties of one species 
in a singular substance. When this singular substance, i.e., natural properties, 
obtains specific attributes and descriptions, it becomes a person (farṣūf 
/šaḫṣ). This is the only text that we read among the works of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib 
in which the term farṣūf (parṣōpā) was found. He identified it with the term 
šaḫṣ, which is used more often to refer to the same metaphysical category53.  
                                                            
50) It is an Arabic transliteration of the Syriac term parṣōpā ( ܪܦܨܐܦܘ ), which also may 
be read as farṣōfā. 
51) The translation is ours. 
52) Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 275 (ch. 11, par. 93-94). 
53) Cf. HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 176. See also Bo HOLMBERG, “„Person‟ in the Trinitari-
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Our author, then, uses the three different categories that Babai devel-
oped in his system. Considering these three categories as three statuses of 
substances confirms our opinion that behind this system there are the three 
types of natures: the abstract, the concrete and the intermediate. In addition, 
we can note that he tries to apply the Cappadocian54 doctrine regarding the 
meaning of hypostasis: a general and common nature with a specific idiom55. 
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib gives an example to his readers in order to make it clear-
er. This example is taken from a quotation in the 13/14th century ms. Vatican 
Arab. 36, which is attributed to our author with the title “The difference be-
tween the substance and the hypostasis”: 
“The difference between the substance 
(ğawhar) and hypostasis (qnūm) and person 
(šaḫṣ)”, attributed to him [to Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib] 
(May God be pleased with him!).  
The substance (ğawhar) is the indication of 
the essence, absolutely, as we say “human 
being”. 
And the hypostasis (uqnūm) is the indication 
of it [the essence] when it becomes, with 
vagueness, particular (taḫaṣṣaṣat) as we say 
“a man” or “a woman”. 
And the person (šaḫṣ) is the indication of it 
[the essence] when it becomes, with pure-
ness, particular (taḫaṣṣaṣat), as we say Moses 
and Mary
56
.  
 نبا[ ول صخشلاو مونقلاو رىولجا نٌب قرفلا
 ،]بيطلاوـنع الله يضر. 
 انلوقك ،قلاطلإا ىلع تاذلا ةللاد رىولجا
.ناسنلإا 
 انلوقك ،مابهبا تصحصتخ اذا اهيلع ةللاد مونقلاو
.ام ةأرماو ام لجر 
يصفتب تصحصتخ اذا اهيلع ةللاد صخشلاو  ،ح
يمرمو ىسوم انلوقك57.57  
First of all, we notice that our author is following the three metaphysical 
categories that Babai developed. Even if these three categories are different 
amongst each other, they are related to each other in some way, they are 
three statuses of the essence. The hypostasis (uqnūm) is a singular nature 
                                                                                                                                           
an Doctrine of Christian Arabic Apologetics and Its Background in the Syriac Church Fa-
thers”, in Studia Patristica 25 (1993), pp. 300-307. 
54) That our author knew very will the doctrine of the Cappadocians, especially the one 
of Basil the Great, is confirmed by the numerous citations and references to his thought that 
he makes in his commentary on Genesis, see for example Ibn Aṭ-Ṭayyib, Commentaire, p. 7; 
this reference to Basil, in addition, is related to Basil‟s doctrine on the Trinity.  
55) We find an affirmation of this in his work, “in fourteen chapters”, see Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, 
Work in fourteen chapters, p. 217 (ch. 8, par. 239): «  ... ةفصب رىولجا وى مونقلأا... »; He also gives 
the same definition in Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ, p. 109: «  ... نم رثكأ وى سيل مونقلأا نلأ
ةفصلا عم تاذلا عمتلر... ». We will return to this topic later in this paper.  
56) The translation is ours.  
57) Vat. ar. 36, f. 138v.  
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without clear specification, i.e., without personal properties, or let us use the 
expression “without personalization”. If the general and common substance 
is the human being, its singular natures are men and women. Simply, men 
and women are the perfect manifestation of the natural characteristics and 
attributes of the common essence. They indicate that this singular hypostasis 
belongs to the species of “human being”.  
When, however, each singular nature, i.e., hypostasis, obtains specific 
attributes and properties, it becomes a person (šaḫṣ). Therefore, we can say 
that we have different singular natures, the difference being indicated in the 
particularity of each singular nature, so that one may be called Moses and 
the other Mary. We think that the key for understanding the thought of Ibn 
aṭ-Ṭayyib is his use of the word “taḫaṣṣaṣat”, which is a verbal form of the 
term “ḫāṣṣah”, property.  
This supports our claim that for our author hypostasis (uqnūm) and per-
son (šaḫṣ) are two different kinds of properties and attributes58, being natural 
and particular. Here, in fact, is the explanation of the expressions “vague-
ness” and “pureness”. Another thing we should note in this citation is the 
non-use of the term farṣūf. This, in our opinion, is because, in contrast with 
its synonym šaḫṣ, the term farṣūf did not enter the Arabic philosophical lexi-
con. Finally, this citation illustrates that these three categories are the three 
kinds of natures developed by the elaboration of Aristotle‟s doctrine on the 
substance with the one of stoicism. 
2. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib‟s metaphysical system and Trinitarian dogma 
How could Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib apply this system to his Trinitarian doctrine? 
We must take into consideration that when he writes about the Trinity, he 
                                                            
58) In his work “in fourteen chapters” our author affirms this opinion by clearly stating 
that the hypostasis is one substance with a property, while the person is substances with many 
properties. It is clear that he is developing his doctrine dealing with the Christological issue, 
so he is talking about substances in one person. What interests us is the fact that hypostasis 
and person are identified with two different kinds of properties and attributes, see Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 218 (ch. 8, par. 244): «نٌب قرفلا مهفي لا نم لوق لوقلا اذى 
.تافصب ةنًثك رىاوج صخشلاو ،ةدحاو ةفصب رىوج مونقلأاو ،صخشلاو مونقلأا.. ». In the same work we notice, 
as we did with Babai, that this identification means simply a manifestation of the attributes 
and properties, so the person manifests the personal attributes, and through its hypostasis 
manifests the natural properties, see Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Work in fourteen chapters, p. 219 (ch. 8, 
par. 246): «  ... لطبيو ،ابه حيسلدا فصو دقو ،بعتلاو يعسلاو لكلأا وىو ،ناسنلاا مونقأ لعف لطبي بىذلدا اذى ىلع
ابه حيسلدا فصو دقو ،ىتولدا ءايحإ وىو ،وللإا مونقأ لعف ...  ». 
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has his opponents specifically in mind, i.e., the Muslims59. This means that 
in applying his metaphysical system, he must be careful not to be understood 
as a tritheist. In addition, we will notice that he uses Muslim language and 
doctrine, especially in the discussion on the divine attributes. 
He said: “The Church believes that the Crea-
tor is one substance (ğawhar) and He is de-
scribed by three attributes (ṣifāt), and it be-
lieves that He is described by three hypostases 
(aqānīm)…”. 
And the substance indicates the essence (ḏāt) 
of the sublime Creator, which, as it is demon-
strated, is one; and the attributes indicate ex-
isting meanings of this essence, and [they] are 
not subsistent essences (ḏawāt qāʼimah bi-
nufūsihā); they are the “paternity”, the “filia-
tion” and the “procession”. And the hyposta-
sis (uqnūm) indicates the result of the essence 
with each one of the attributes. So when the 
essence is taken with the meaning of paterni-
ty, the result is called “Father”, when the same 
[essence] is taken with the meaning of the fili-
ation [it] is called “Son”, and when it is taken 
with the meaning of the procession [it] is 
called “Holy Spirit”…
60 
 فوصوم دحاو رىوج ئرابلا نا دقتعت ةعيبلا لاق
 ةثلاثب فصوي ونبأ ويف دقتعتو ثلاث تافصب
 ... ميناقأ 
 دق تيلا لىاعت ئرابلا تاذ لىا وب راشي رىولجاو
 ناعم لىا ابه راشي تافصلاو ةدحاو انهأ نبا
 يى اهسوفنب ةمئاق تاوذ لا تاذلا هذلذ ةدوجوم
راشي مونقلأاو ،ثاعبناو ةونبو ةوبأ  عمتلر لىا وب
 اذا تاذلا ناف تافصلا نم ةدحاو لك عم تاذلا
 اذاو بأ ونا عمتلمجا في ليق ةوبلأا نىعم عم تذخأ
 نبا انها اهيف ليق ةونبلا نىعم عم اهنيعب تذخا
 حور انها اهيف ليق ثاعبنلاا نىعم عم تذخأ اذاو
. سدقلا.. 6161. 
 
From the first affirmation we notice that for Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib the unique-
ness of God is to be found in the fact that the divine nature is one: God is 
one according to his substance (ğawhar), which is his essence (ḏāt). The se-
cond thing we should note is that this one essence is described by three at-
tributes (ṣifāt) and by three hypostases (aqānīm). Does our author limit the 
metaphysical function of hypostasis to describing the general essence? If the 
answer is yes, does he identify hypostasis with the attribute?  
In the same citation above, it is clear that the attributes, which are also 
called “meanings” (maʻānī), are not subsistent essences (ḏawāt). This means 
that the attributes are not identified with hypostases (aqānīm), which are es-
sences as he claimed in his metaphysical system above. As a consequence, 
when Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib mentions that the divine essence is described by three 
                                                            
59) As we said, our author never mentions Muslims in his works, although it is clear 
that he writes apologetically to them as we will demonstrate in our analysis, see also FAULT-
LESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, p. 670. 
60) The translation is ours. 
61) Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ wa-t-tawḥīd, p. 109. 
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attributes and three aqānīm, he is intending two different metaphysical cate-
gories. The attributes, in fact, according to our text, are the “paternity”, the 
“filiation” and the “procession”. This causes or leads us to argue that for him 
the attributes in Trinitarian doctrine are the idioms of the persons (ašḫāṣ) of 
his metaphysical system62. 
As for Babai, “person” for Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib is the idiom of the Cappadoci-
ans, and in our case is called attribute (ṣifah). It is the group of the personal 
and individual properties of each singular substance. Attention, however, 
should be placed on Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib‟s approach to the Cappadocian system, 
and how he modifies Babai‟s system and applies it. He does not use the met-
aphysical term person (farṣūf/šaḫṣ), even though it is used in his general 
metaphysical doctrine, as we have seen above. For him, the Father is already 
a specific hypostasis, i.e., hypostasis with an attribute, which is the meaning 
of the paternity. For Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib the Cappadocian affirmation that the es-
sence with an idiom forms the hypostasis is accepted under one condition: 
this general essence with the attribute makes not just any hypostasis, but a 
specific one. According to his metaphysical system, this hypostasis is a per-
son, i.e., a singular subsistent substance individualized and personalized. In 
other words, it makes a particular substance63. 
If the three divine aqānīm are known and recognized as Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit, this means that they are already specific aqānīm, that is, hyposta-
ses with their persons (individual attributes of paternity, filiation and proces-
sion). The divine essence is one, but it is an abstract concept; it obtains its ex-
istence through the hypostases. These hypostases, however, are with their at-
tributes, because they exist with the relation between them, i.e., they are cause 
and caused64. The following scheme further clarifies this point: 
 
 
 
                                                            
62) Regarding the difference between hypostasis and person according to our author, 
see HADDAD, La Trinité, pp. 150, 157. 
63) See also a comment on this in HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 154. 
64) See also his Maqālah muḫtaṣarah fī al-aqānīm wa-l-ğawhar wa anna al-fiʻl li-l-
ğawhar, “Brief treatise on the hypostases and substance, and the fact that action pertains to 
the substance”, edited twice, once by Gérard Troupeau and the second time by Samir Khalil 
Samir, cf. FAULTLESS, «Ibn al-Ṭayyib», 694. We were not able to read and check either of the-
se editions, but since this work exists in one manuscript only, Vat. ar. 145, ff. 70v-73v, we 
were able to read the manuscript and check the text of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib.  
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The Father is the divine essence subsisting and recognized by a specific 
attribute, it is a hypostasis with a person. The Son is recognized as Son be-
cause of his relation to the Father; He is caused by the hypostasis of the Fa-
ther, who is a divine particular essence, so He is also divine particular es-
sence, (divine hypostasis). However, being caused by the Father, i.e., the in-
ter-trinitarian relation, He has his attribute eternally, that is, the person of fil-
iation. As a consequence, He is recognized to be Son, hypostasis and person. 
We can say the same about the Holy Spirit.  
In his “Treatise on the Trinity and Unity”, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib declares that 
the result of the essence and the attribute is a specific hypostasis, i.e., hypos-
tasis with person. Before we cite the text in which he mentions this doctrine, 
we need to underline the fact that in his apologetic works regarding Trinitar-
ian dogma, he develops Trinitarian analogy, as all Arab-Christian theologi-
ans do. He chose the one of “knowledge” (ʻilm), “knower” (ʻālim), and 
“known” (maʻlūm)65. For him, these are three attributes that characterize the 
divine essence. This essence has the “knowledge”, i.e., the Father, this es-
sence knows itself, so it is “knower”, i.e., the Son, and it is also “known” to 
itself, i.e., the Holy Spirit
66
. It is clear that to develop such an analogy, he 
                                                            
65) Cf. HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 228. 
66) Cf. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ, p. 81: «  و ئرابلا تاذ نأ دقتعت ىراصنلا نا لوقنف ةدحا
 ،ةفصلا هذى دض ىلع نوكت نأ ىلع تلاعت ،ملعلا ةفص الذ تاذ يى تاذلا هذى نأ اًضيا دقتعتو ... ديحوتلا ةلدبأ
 اتهاذف اتهاذ ملعت تناك اذاو اتهاذ ملعت يهف ملعت نأ انهأش لىاعت ئرابلا تاذف ملعت نأ انهأش ملعلا ةفصب نوكت تيلا تاذلاو
 ملعلا ةفص الذ لصحتيف الذ ةمولعممولعلداو لماعلاو  »; see also Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ wa-t-
tawḥīd, p. 113: « ةفصب نوكت نأ ولتخ لا تاذلا هذى نأ مولعمو ،ةدحاو انهأو ةدوجوم لىاعت ئرابلا تاذ نأ تبث دق
اعلا نٌلداعلا ةفص الذ نوكت نأ يقبف نياثلا مسقلا نم تيشوحو لا وأ نٌلقاعلا نٌلداعلا مولعلا قلاخ نوكي نأ لالز ونلأ نٌلق
 نوكتف اتهاذ ملعت يىو تامولعلدا ىدحا اتهاذو اتهاذ ملعت نا ةوق اهلف ةفصلا هذبه تناك اذاو ،لقاع لاو لماع نًغ لوقعلاو
Father 
Hypostasis 
of the Father 
Divine essence with 
the attribute of pater-
nity (person of the 
Father) 
Hypostasis  
(divine subsistent 
substance) 
Person 
(attribute of 
paternity) 
= = = + 
Son 
Hypostasis 
of the Son 
Divine essence with 
the attribute of filia-
tion (person of the 
Son) 
Hypostasis  
(divine subsistent 
substance) 
Person 
(attribute of 
filiation) 
r 
= = = + 
Holy 
Spirit 
Hypostasis 
of the Holy 
Spirit 
Divine essence with 
the attribute of pro-
cession (person of the 
Holy Spirit) 
Hypostasis  
(divine subsistent 
substance) 
Person 
(attribute of 
procession) 
= = = + 
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uses as a basis the discussion on the attributes that describe the divine es-
sence. We will return to this topic further on in this paper. For now, let us 
read how he uses this analogy and integrates it into his metaphysical system: 
And the Christians define the essence (al-ḏāt) 
as substance, not similar to the [created] sub-
stances, and they nominate the attributes 
(ṣifāt) properties (ḫawāṣṣ). 
They name the attribute of knowledge “pater-
nity”, and the attribute of knower “filiation”, 
and the attribute of known “procession”. 
They name the sum [i.e., the results] that are 
[composed] by the essence with the attributes 
hypostases (aqānīm). 
And when the essence is taken with the mean-
ing of knowledge, this sum is called the hy-
postasis of the Father (uqnūm al-Āb). 
And when it is taken with the meaning of the 
knower, this sum is called the hypostasis of 
the Son (uqnūm al-Ibn). 
And when it is taken with the meaning of the 
known, this sum is called the hypostasis of 
the Spirit (uqnūm al-Rūḥ)
67. 
رىاولجاك لا رىوج انها تاذلا في لوقت ىراصنلاو 
،صاوخ تافصلا يمستو 
 ةونب لماعلا ةفصو ةوبأ انهومسيف ملعلا ةفص امأ
.ًثًاعبنا مولعلدا ةفصو 
 تافصلا عم تاذلا نم تيلا لملجا نومسيو
 ،ميناقأ 
 هذى تيعد ملعلا نىعم عم تذخأ اذإ تاذلاو
،بلأا مونقأ ةلملجا 
 ةلملجا هذى تيسم لماعلا نىعم عم تذخأ اذإو
،نبلإا مونقأ 
 تذخأ اذإو ةلملجا هذى تيسم مولعلدا نىعم عم
حورلا مونقأ68.68 
According to such a system, the three hypostases can describe the di-
vine essence, as Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib affirms in the above citation. Since the 
aqānīm include the attributes within themselves, i.e., the persons, they also 
describe the divine essence. It is clear again that there is no identification be-
tween hypostasis and attribute, but there is a relation. Let us read the follow-
ing quotation, which further illustrates our analysis:  
And since the hypostasis (uqnūm) is the result  عم تاذلا عمتلر نم رثكأ وى سيل مونقلأا نلأ
                                                                                                                                           
اتهاذل ةمولعم تراصو اتهاذ تملع دقو ملعت نأ ىلع ةوق اهيف تاذ انل لصحتف الذ ةمولعم اتهاذ ». Regarding this 
analogy see HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 228. 
67) The translation is ours.  
68) Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ, pp. 81,83. We find the same affirmation in his 
“Treatise on the Trinity and Unity”, but without the application of the term uqnūm to the Fa-
ther and the Son and the Spirit, although he says that these three are aqānīm: « لك تذخأ اذإو
 عم تذخأ اذا ةوبلأبا اهيلع لولدلدا يىو ملعلا ىلع ةوقلا ةفصف ،مونقأ ةلملجا نم ناك تاذلا عم تافصلا هذى نم ةدحاو
 ونبأ ونع برعي اذىو ملعت نأ انهأش نم تاذ انها تاذلا في ليق تاذلا اذإ ةونبلبا اهيلع لولدلدا يىو اتهاذل اهملع ةفصو ،بأ
 موقن تاذلا عم تذخأ اذا ةمولعم انهوك ةفصو ،نبلإا مونقبا ونع برعلدا وىو لماعلا نىعم ةلملجا نم موقت تاذلا عم تذخأ
حورلبا اهنع برعلدا يىو ةلجم عيملجا نم », Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ wa-t-tawḥīd, p. 113. 
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of the essence (ḏāt) with the attribute (ṣifah); 
and since the attributes (ṣifāt) are three, if the 
essence is taken with each one of them, the 
result is one hypostasis (uqnūm). As a conse-
quence, the Creator is one and many; one, 
from the side of the essence (ḏāt) and many 
from the side of the hypostases (aqānīm)
69. 
 تاذلا تذخأ اذإف .ثلاث تافصلا نلأو ،ةفصلا
 ئرابلا نوكيف اًمونقأ كلذ ناك اهنم ةدحاو لك عم
 ًانًثك تاذلا لبق نم اًدحاو ًانًثكو اًدحاو لىاعت نم
ميناقلأا لبق70.70 
The last sentence, in fact, is similar to the one of his metaphysical rules 
presented above. Here we present a comparison: 
When [the essence] obtains a multitude of 
descriptions [i.e. attributes], according to one 
side, it could be considered one, and accord-
ing to another, many. It is one, from the side 
of the substance (ğawhar), it is, [however], 
many, from the side of its descriptions [i.e. 
attributes]. 
As a consequence, the Creator is one and 
many; one, from the side of the essence (ḏāt) 
and many from the side of the hypostases 
(aqānīm). 
It is clear, then, that within the Trinitarian field, when our author af-
firms that the hypostases (aqānīm) describe the divine nature and that they 
are, in some way, identified by attributes, i.e., the individual idioms of each 
hypostasis (property, ḫāṣṣah), he means that these hypostases are eternally 
with persons, because they came to exist through a relation between them71.  
In our opinion, there are two reasons behind this interpretation and 
modification of Babai‟s system: 1) on the one hand, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib wants to 
maintain one cause in the Trinity, i.e., the Father as hypostasis and person; 2) 
on the other hand, he also desires to underline the unity of the three hyposta-
ses in the one common essence.  
                                                            
69) The translation is ours.  
70) Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ wa-t-tawḥīd, p. 109. 
71) For some scholars the Nestorian Church identified hypostasis with attribute, see in 
the introduction of Robert CASPAR, “Les versions arabes du dialogue entre le Catholicos Tim-
othée I et le Calife al-Mahdī (IIe/VIIIe Siècle) „Mohammed a suivi la voie des prophètes‟ ”, in 
Islamocristiana 3 (1977), 107-175, here 121. But, in fact, this identification must be read un-
der the conditions that our author gives. For example, if here in Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib we do not find a 
clear identification between hypostasis and attribute, in Elias of Nisibis, a contemporary Nes-
torian author of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, the hypostases are attributes. Since both authors are of the 
same church, we think the key for understanding this identification in Elias is the doctrine of 
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib here. For the Trinitarian doctrine in Elias see EBEID, La Tunica, pp. 451-482. 
Years before Elias, the Coptic bishop Sāwīrūs Ibn al-Muqaffaʻ identified hypostasis with at-
tribute, but he had a different basis for this identification and, as a result, a different doctrinal 
outcome, see EBEID, La Tunica, pp. 293-307, see also Mark SWANSON, “Are Hypostases At-
tributes? An investigation into the Modern Egyptian Christian Appropriation of the Medieval 
Arabic Apologetic Heritage”, in ParOr 16 (1990-1991), pp. 239-250.  
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The cause cannot be an abstract reality, but the common nature is ab-
stract. To resolve this problem, he considers the hypostasis a perfect mani-
festation of the common essence in a singular way that is the common es-
sence with the attribute. The Father in this case is not identified with the ab-
stract common nature, but being the cause, he manifests this common nature 
perfectly, and the hypostases caused by him also manifest perfectly the 
common nature. To explain this problem and to resolve it, he again uses the 
analogy of “knowledge” (ʻilm), “knower” (ʻālim) and “known” (maʻlūm). 
Through this analogy he tries to show that the three hypostases as essence 
are one, co-existing together eternally. Having one cause (Father) and two 
caused (Son and Spirit) does not mean that this one cause is of the divine es-
sence and its existence. Rather, it is simply cause of itself, i.e., it manifests 
the inter-trinitarian relations:  
And if we say that the Father is cause and the 
Son and the Spirit are caused, this should not 
be understood that we mean cause of exist-
ence [i.e., creation], because the essence is 
one numerically.  
The Father, however, who is the same es-
sence with the power of knowledge, is the 
cause of the Son and the Spirit, I mean, the 
same essence with the [ability] to be knower 
and known.  
It is one essence, a cause of itself, not [as a 
cause] of [its] existence. If we, [however], 
comprise the essence of the Creator with the 
rest of the created beings, it [the divine es-
sence] is cause of their existence [of the cre-
ated beings] and of their formation and their 
creation72.  
 حورلاو نبلاا فيو ةلع ونا بلاا في انلق ناو ننحو
  ذا دوجو ةلع ديرن ناأ انم مهفي لاف نلاولعم امنها
 ،ددعلبا ةدحاو تاذلا تناك 
 ىلع ةوقلا عم اهسفن تاذلا وىو بلأا نأ لاا
 في اهسفن تاذلا نيعأ حورلاو نبلاا ةلع وى ملعلا
 ةمولعمو ةلداع نوكت نأ 
نل ةلع ًةدحاو ًتًاذ نوكتف اماف دوجولا في لا اهسف
 اىاوس تادوجولدا يقبا لىا ئرابلا تاذ انسق اذا
اهثادحاو انهوكو اىدوجول ةلع نوكت انهاف74.73  
In this way, he maintains a differentiation between the three metaphysi-
cal categories: essence, hypostasis and person; and at the same time, he tries 
to be closer to the Cappadocian doctrine and consistent with the official doc-
trine of his church. He does not have as a basis, as Rachid Haddad claimed, 
the neoplatonic doctrine74. According to us, he is taking an Aristotelian ap-
proach to Babai‟s system75. 
                                                            
72 ) The translation is ours. 
73) Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ wa-t-tawḥīd, pp. 119, 121. 
74) Cf. HADDAD, La Trinité, pp. 243-245. 
75) Cf. FAULTLESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, p. 670. 
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The question that arises from such analysis is why did our author avoid 
using the term of person (farṣūf/šaḫṣ), even though he applied it as a con-
cept, since he identified it with the attributes and the properties? A quick an-
swer could be that he wanted to be consistent with the official doctrine of his 
church. The key, however, comes from his historical context and the discus-
sion regarding the divine attributes. 
3. Divine attributes and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib‟s metaphysical system 
One important element of the Christian-Muslim dialogue at the time of 
our author, and even earlier, was the divine attributes. It was also a dialogi-
cal topic among the different Islamic theological and philosophical schools. 
The question was the following: if the divine attributes are eternal as God is, 
it means that they co-exist with him and, as a consequence, there is polythe-
ism in God, or as Muslims call it, širk76. 
Having this element in mind, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, who accepted the metaphysi-
cal system of Babai and modified it to explain the Trinitarian doctrine, also 
developed it through the doctrine on the divine attributes77. First of all, his 
doctrine on the attributes of God consists of the distinction between two kinds 
of attributes: essential (ṣifāt ḏāt) and verbal (ṣifāt fiʻl/taʻaddī)78. The essential 
attributes describe the divine essence and the inter-trinitarian relation of the 
                                                            
76) On this topic one can read the second chapter of Harry Austryn WOLFSON, The Phi-
losophy of the Kalam, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-Massachusetts-London 1976, pp. 
112-232. See also Harry Austryn WOLFSON, “The Muslim Attributes and the Christian Trini-
ty”, in The Harvard Theological Review 49 (1956), pp. 1-18; David THOMAS, “The Doctrine 
of the Trinity in the Early Abbasid Era”, in Lloyd RIDGEON, ed., Islamic Interpretations of 
Christianity, St. Martins‟ Press, New York, 2001, pp. 78-98; Sidney GRIFFITH, “The Unity 
and Trinity of God: Christian Doctrinal Development in Response to the Challenge of Islam - 
An Historical Perspective”, in Michael ROOT & James J. BUCKLEY, ed., Christian Theology 
and Islam, James Clarke & Co, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 11-21; Sara HUSSEINI, Early Christian-
Muslim Debate on the Unity of God: Three Christian Scholars and Their Engagement with 
Islamic Thought (9th Century C.E.), Brill, Leiden, 2014. 
77) For a short comment on Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib‟s doctrine on the divine attributes see FAULT-
LESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, p. 670; See also HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 156. 
78) We would like to mention here that in this division of attributes we note the nucleus 
of the discussion regarding the distinction between essence and energy in God, which was 
developed during the 11th century in Byzantium. This discussion, however, was based on the 
doctrine of Basil the Great, cf. Γεώργιος ΜΑΡΣΖΈΛΟ΢, Οςζία και Ενέπγειαι ηος Θεού καηά ηον 
Μέγαν Βαζίλειον. Σςμβολή ειρ ηην ιζηοπικοδογμαηικήν διεπεύνηζιν ηηρ πεπί οςζίαρ και 
ενεπγειών ηος Θεού διδαζκαλίαρ ηηρ Οπθοδόξος Εκκληζίαρ, Ποσρναράς, Thessaloniki, 1984, 
pp. 13-26. Again, we then see a Cappadocian influence in our author. However, we think that 
this topic requires another and more detailed research. See also HADDAD, La Trinité, pp. 189-
190. 
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 nairatinirt-artxe eht ebircsed ,revewoh ,setubirtta labrev ehT .sesatsopyh eerht
  .sgnieb detaerc rehto eht htiw doG fo noitaler eht ,.e.i ,noitaler
 ew ;enirtcod s‟biyyaṬ-ṭa nbI fo tcepsa siht ezylana ot ecalp eht ton si sihT
-wonk“ ,)mliʻ( ”egdelwonk“ fo ygolana eht taht noitnem ot ekil ylpmis dluow
-er noinipo sih nialpxe ot ereh desu osla si )mūlʻam( ”nwonk“ dna )milāʻ( ”re
 ecnesse eht fo era setubirtta eerht esehT .97setubirtta fo sdnik owt eht gnidrag
 rehtaF eht tuoba sklat erutpircS esuaceb 08eerht ylno era yehT .ti ebircsed dna
 eerht ni eveileb ot noitaripsni enivid si ti ,.e.i ,tiripS yloH eht dna noS eht dna
 ytissecen eht etartsnomed ot seirt rohtua ruo ,noitidda nI ;18sesatsopyh enivid
 tser ehT 28.stnemurtsni lacigol dna lacihposolihp hguorht eerht rebmun eht fo
 doG neewteb noitaler eht ebircsed yeht dna laitnesse ton era setubirtta eht fo
 )milāʻ( ”rewonk“ ,)mliʻ( ”egdelwonk“ si doG yas ew nehW .serutaerc siH dna
 fo rewop eht sah taht ecnesse siH gnibircsed era ew ,)mūlʻam( ”nwonk“ dna
 doG ,revewoh ,yas ew nehW .flesti ot nwonk si dna ,flesti swonk ,egdelwonk
 ,serutaerc sih htiw nosirapmoc ni taht stsefinam siht ,rotaerC ro ,lufrewop si
  .rotaerC rieht si eH dna lufrewop si eH
 setubirtta labrev eht taht swohs osla eh hcaorppa nailetotsirA na morF
                                                            
فصفات الذات ىي الثلاث صفات التي قلنا، لا « :58 .p ,ṯīlṯat-ta īf halāqaM ,biyyaṬ-ṭa nbI .fC )97
يجوز ان تزيد عليها ولا تنقص منها وىي صفة العلم والعالم والدعلوم ولا تتخطى ذات البارئ الى غنًىا، وبهذا السبب قالت 
ت البارئ ثلاث ووقفت عند ثلاثة اقانيم. فأما وصفو بأنو خالق الدخلوقات فهي صفة تتعلق بالبارئ النصارى ان صفا
وبالدخلوقات اذ كانت صفة تدل على خلق الدخلوقات، وكذلك صفة رازق وحكيم تتعداه الى الأمور الدتقنة والدرزوقة وصفة 
 ṯīlṯat-ta īf halāqaM ,biyyaṬ-ṭa nbI osla ees ;»  عليوجائد تتعداه الى المجود عليو وصفة قادر تتعداه الى الدقدور 
والجواب أن صفات البارئ تعالى على ضربنٌ، صفة تتعدى الذات الى الدخلوقنٌ ولا تقف عند « :511 .p ,dīḥwat-t-aw
واد تجر جوىر الذات، بل تجر معها جوىًرا آخر كصفة قادر فانها صفة لله تعالى تجر معها جوىر الدقدور وكذلك صفة الج
معها جوىر المجود وصفة القدم تجر معها الزمان. والبيعة تعتقد أن البارئ ثلاثة اقانيم جوىر واحد فما كثر من صفات الذات 
لا يدخل في الاعتقاد لأن صاحب الشريعة انما وقفنا على الصفات التي لا تفي العقول البشرية بالوقوف عليها ولا 
لذات، وبأنها ثلاث أعني الصفات التي تخص الذات فبحسبها تكون الاقانيم قلاقة لا استقصائها، وىذه ىي التي تخص ا
ومعلوم أن الاوصاف « :)53 ,91 .hc( 114 .p ,sretpahc neetruof ni kroW ,biyyaṬ-ṭa nbI ;» ئاءدة ولا ناقصة
لوجود الوصف بأنها موجودة، التي يوصف بها البارئ (تعالى) تنقسم الى: صفات الذات وصفات التعدي. وصفات الذات با
ومع كمال الوجود وفي غايتو، وإذا كانت ىكذا، فلها الثلاثية بحسب الوجود. والفرق بنٌ الكمال والغاية، أن الكمال كمال 
ذات، والغاية كمال تصرف الذات بحسب نفسها. فتكون أوصافها من جهة الوجود ثلاثة وىكذا من جهة العلم ثلاثة: قوة 
وكمال العلم. فأما صفات التعدي فبقياس الدوجودات، فهذه، وان كانت كثنًة، فهي تجتمع في ثلاث: في  العلم، والعلم
الوجود، والقدرة، والحكمة، والعلة في اجتماعها في ىذه الثلاثة: من قبل أصل الوجود، فهذا كان بالجود، لا بالقسر، ومن 
ل كونو على النظام، فهذا يوجب لو الحكمة. فتكون ىذه قبل كونو في الغاية، فهذا يوجب لو صفة القدرة، ومن قب
 122,591 .pp ,étinirT aL ,DADDAH osla eeS ;» الأوصاف: بقياس نفسو وجوًدا وعلًما، وبقياس لسلوقاتو.
فصفات الذات ىي الثلاث صفات التي قلنا، لا « :58 .p ,ṯīlṯat-ta īf halāqaM ,biyyaṬ-ṭa nbI .fC )08
ا ولا تنقص منها ... والنصارى ليس تمتنع من وصف البارئ باكثر من ثلاث صفات لكنها تمتنع من ان يجوز ان تزيد عليه
-ṭa nbI osla ees ;» تصفو باكثر من ثلاث صفات تخص الذات فأما صفات الفعل فليس تقف فيها عند حد معنٌ
فات التي تخص الذات فبحسبها وبأنها ثلاث أعني الص « :511 .p ,dīḥwat-l-aw ṯīlṯat-la īf halāqaM ,biyyaṬ
 .»  اءدة ولا ناقصةز تكون الاقانيم قلاقة لا 
 .rap ,91 .hc( 414-214 .pp ,sretpahc neetruof ni kroW ,biyyaṬ-ṭa nbI ,elpmaxe rof eeS )18
 .301-201 ,99 ,enivid étinirT aL ,DADDAH osla eeS .)74-73
 .)63 .rap ,91 .hc( 114 .p ,sretpahc neetruof ni kroW ,biyyaṬ-ṭa nbI ,elpmaxe rof eeS )28
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exist in God eternally, so they are in him as «δσνάμει εἶναι» (bi-l-quwwah), 
i.e. He has the power to manifest them. At one specific time, these attributes 
are manifested as «ἐνέργεια εἶναι» (bi-l-fiʻl)83. It is also notable that in this 
explanation, he is modifying the Cappadocian use of Aristotle‟s system. 
They talked about «δσνάμει εἶναι», «ἐνέργεια εἶναι», «εὖ εἶναι», to show 
that the energy of God is one, and each hypostasis has its own role in mani-
festing this one energy84. For our author, however, the interest is to prove 
that the verbal attributes exist eternally in God. In conclusion, we can say 
that for Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib all the attributes are of the divine essence, however, 
one group describes the essence as it exists, while the other group describes 
the actions of this essence, either as “power to act” or as “manifestation of 
the action”.  
According to Babai‟s system there are two kinds of properties: the natu-
ral and the personal. The hypostasis (qnōmā) manifests the natural, that is, 
the common substance. The person (parṣōpā) is the group of the individual 
idioms of one hypostasis, its personalization. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, on the one hand, 
wants to maintain Babai‟s system as a basis of his doctrine, and, on the other 
hand, has in mind the discussion on God‟s attributes and their two kinds, 
which are the essential and the verbal. In our opinion, his desire not to com-
plicate his system so that it could be comprehended by his Muslim readers, 
and his will to demonstrate that the hypostases are eternal attributes of the 
divine essence and are not identified with the essence but coexist and de-
scribe it, led him to modify Babai‟s system and to interpret it in a very inter-
esting way. 
First of all, he avoids using the term person (farṣūf/šaḫṣ) in his Trinitar-
ian doctrine, and we think that he gives the attribute (ṣifah) and property 
(ḫāṣṣah) the metaphysical function of Babai‟s parṣōpā, but with some dif-
ference. Attribute, in this case, is essential, i.e., it describes the common es-
sence. The result of this description is one specific hypostasis (uqnūm). We 
see, in addition, an approach to the Cappadocians‟ system, but even in this 
approach our author departs from it by explaining it in a way we would call 
an Aristotelian interpretation of Babai‟s system. The attribute, then, is not 
exactly as Babai‟s parṣōpā, that is, the individual properties of one qnōmā. 
                                                            
83) Cf. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Maqālah fī at-taṯlīṯ wa-t-tawḥīd, p. 115: « هذبه فصوي لىاعت ئرابلاف
 ام ةردقلا ناف اًضيا ةوقلبا مدقلا في الذ دوجوم وهف ولعفت امو ،لعفت نأ انهأش تاكلمو ويف انهأ ىلع مدقلا في تافصلا
 وقلبا تماد نلأ لعفلبا داوجو ميكح ونبا فصوي لماعلا دايجا دعبو لعفلبا اىرودقم راص تلعف اذاو ةوقلبا اىرودقمف ة
اًضيا نقتلداو لعفلبا دجو رودقلدا »; Regarding Aristotle thought see ΜΑΡΣΖΈΛΟ΢, “Η έννοια”, p. 57. 
84) Cf. ΜΑΡΣΖΕΛΟ΢, “Η έννοια”, pp. 72-73. 
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The attribute for Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib describes the common essence (ḏāt) and 
forms with it a particular substance, an uqnūm. The result in both systems is 
the same: a specific hypostasis, i.e., a singular substance with personal and 
individual property.  
Although Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib makes this modification, he maintains three dif-
ferent metaphysical categories in his system. He refuses, however, to use the 
term “person” for the reason of its meaning in the Arabic philosophical lexi-
con. First of all, the term farṣūf is not used in such lexicon; the term šaḫṣ, in 
fact, is its synonym and replaces it metaphysically. Šaḫṣ in Arabic means in-
dividual, and this concept contains the meaning of division within itself85. If 
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib would apply it in Trinitarian dogma, as he does in the anthro-
pological field of Christology86, the Trinity would be understood as a trithe-
istic doctrine87.  
The reasons which led Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib to interpret Babai‟s system in this 
way are now clear. We should pay attention, however, to the fact that when 
we say that he considers the attributes as essential, he does not understand 
them as the category of natural properties. They describe the divine essence, 
but at the same time each attribute gives the essence a different description, 
giving it a different personalization. His whole purpose is to convey the idea 
that, since the hypostases include the common essence and different attrib-
utes, they describe the common essence through its perfect manifestation in 
each hypostasis, without, however, underlining that the hypostases are three 
particular substances of the common species. In this way, the hypostases are 
not understood to be three divided realities and individuals, which would be 
tritheism or polytheism. As a result, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib at the same time tries to 
follow Babai‟s system, to modify it to be in concordance with the official 
faith of his church, and to elaborate it in order to answer the questions re-
garding the issues of his time, i.e., the divine attributes. He is a real inter-
                                                            
85) See in regards the opinion of the Nestorian „Ammār al-Baṣrī, Apologie et Contro-
verses (coll. “Recherches, Nouvelle Série B”, 5), Arabic text edited by Michel AL-HAYEK, 
Dār al-mašriq, Beyrouth, 1977, pp. 161-162. 
86) For our author the term šaḫṣ when it is applied to human beings means a single hu-
man nature, i.e., an individual. This is clear in his Christological doctrine as he calls the hu-
manity of Christ the assumed human person (šaḫṣ), with whom God was united. cf. Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib, al-Kalām fī al-ittiḥād, p. 149: « سيل ونلأو وب دتّاو اًصخش ذتخا مسبج سيلو ةسوسلمحا ءايشلأا نم 
لماعلل وطسوتب رهظو »; see also Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Al-Kalām fī al-ittiḥād, p. 194 (ch. 8, par 138):        
«  ...... ةديسلا نم ذوخألدا صخشلا تم ابه تيلا ةونبلا وىو  ». 
87) Cf. HADDAD, La Trinité, p. 176; See also FAULTLESS, “Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, p. 670. We 
came to the same conclusion regarding another author of the same church, i.e., Elias of Nsi-
bis. See, EBEID, La Tunica, p. 479. 
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preter, philosopher and theologian of his church. 
4. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib‟s Christological approach  
As we said, according to the Christological doctrine of Babai and the 
official Christology of the Church of the East after the year 612, Christ is the 
union of two natures and two hypostases. He is the one person of filiation, 
one Christ and Son. This means that the person of the Son was given to the 
qnōmā of the human being in Christ so that it could be personalized.  
We would now like to present very briefly the Christology of Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib in order to see how he explains it after having modified Babai‟ sys-
tem:  
And the belief of this group [Nestorians, Orien-
tals] regarding the union is that the two substanc-
es (al-ğawharayn) remain as they are, and the 
two hypostases (al-uqnūmayn) as they are, and 
the union took place in the property (ḫāṣṣah) of 
the filiation, which is the meaning of knowing the 
Creator‟s essence of itself. This person (šaḫṣ) 
[Jesus] chosen from the Lady. [Mary] shared this 
property (ḫāṣṣah) with God, and became from it 
one Christ, one Son, not one substance (ğawhar) 
or one hypostasis (uqnūm)
88. 
ع نيرىولجا نأ داتّلاا في ةقرفلا هذى داقتعاو ىل
 عوقوو ،امهعابط ىلع نٌمونقلأاو ،امهعابط
 نىعم انهإو ،اىناررق تيلا ةونبلا ةصاخ في داتّلاا
 صخشلا اذهف .وسفنب ئرابلا تاذ ملع
 هذى في وللإا كراش ةديسلا نم ىفطصلدا
 ،اًدحاو اًنبا ،اًدحاو اًحيسم اهنم راصف ،ةحصالخا
دحاو مونقأ لاو دحاو رىوج لا90.89 
 
And through these arguments it is demonstrated 
that Christ, after the union, is two substances 
(ğawharān) and two hypostases (uqnūmān), one 
Son. The union, then, is in the filiation, [not] in 
the substance (ğawhar) nor in the hypostases 
(uqnūm)
90. 
ا حنأ نبا دق ججلحا هذهبف دعب نم ،حيسلد
 داتّلااف .دحاو نبا ،نامونقأو نارىوج ،داتّلإا
 في لاو ،رىولجا في ]لا[ ،ةونبلا في وى نذإ
مونقلاا91.91 
The interesting thing in this Christological approach is that Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib differs, in some way, from the traditional and official doctrine of his 
church; he does not mention the term “person” to express the uniqueness in 
Christ92. Even though Christ is one, the subject after the union is one Christ 
and one Son. There are, however, two united substances and two united hy-
postases in this one subject. So terminologically, he differs from his tradi-
tion, but the content is the same.  
                                                            
88) The translation is ours. 
89) Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Al-Kalām fī al-ittiḥād, p. 193 (ch. 8, par. 130). 
90) The translation is ours. 
91) Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Al-Kalām fī al-ittiḥād, p. 197 (ch. 8, par. 152). 
92) We arrived at the same conclusion regarding Elias of Nisibis. See, EBEID, La Tuni-
ca, pp. 569-570. 
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Instead of talking about the person of the union, the person of filiation, 
as it is called in his tradition, i.e., the person of Christ and Son, he mentions 
that the union took place in the property of filiation. According to our analy-
sis, however, the essential property and attribute has the function of Babai‟s 
parṣōpā. In this case, he follows the doctrine of his church applying to it his 
development of the metaphysical system.  
The divine essence with the one property of filiation forms the hyposta-
sis of the eternal Son. With the same property the human substance forms 
the hypostasis of the man taken from the Virgin Mary.  
What is interesting in all of this is that at one side, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib does 
not use the term person (šaḫṣ) as a term for the metaphysical concept of 
parṣōpā, even though in his metaphysical system this term is mentioned 
clearly. At the other side, however, he uses this term, as we said above, for 
the human being in Christ in order to underline that the humanity in Christ is 
one individual, one single human hypostasis and person. He made this modi-
fication for one reason, which is to emphasize that the humanity in Christ is 
not an abstract nature, or the common substance of humanity, but one single 
substance.  
He could not apply the term šaḫṣ to the divine hypostasis because, as 
we said, he wished to avoid being understood as tritheistic. What is im-
portant in this case is to underline the fact that the union was made between 
one uqnūm of the three divine hypostases, the Son, with one single man, the 
šaḫṣ taken from Mary. It is clear that in this case the term šaḫṣ is only used 
in anthropological doctrine, and means a singular, personalized substance 
and one individual93. In the Trinitarian field, however, it is not used.  
In conclusion, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib‟s, in his theological thought modified his 
metaphysical system, and as a result, he created two different metaphysical 
categories: person (šaḫṣ) and property (ṣifah/ḫāṣṣah). Hypostasis in Trinitar-
ian doctrine is specific, so it includes its particular attribute and property. It 
is not person, since the three hypostases are not separated realities. However, 
in anthropological doctrine, the specific hypostasis, that is the essence and 
                                                            
93) In fact one can notice that in anthropological context šaḫṣ is to be considered as a 
synonym of hypostasis (uqnūm), which is a single subsistent substance personalized and indi-
vidualized, see for example this identification in his commentary on Genesis Ibn Aṭ-ṭayyib, 
Commentaire, p. 28: « ا اذبه مدا ةيمستو لولاو ةيسنج ةيمستف نياثلا اما لجرلا مساو مسلاةيصخش.  تيسم كلذكو
 لولااو ةيسنجف نياثلا اما .ةارلدا مسباو مسلاا اذبه اوحةيمونق ». In addition, the same use we find in Elias of 
Nisibis, cf. EBEID, La Tunica, p. 570. 
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one attribute, is one person, i.e., an individual, since it is a separated reality.  
CONCLUSION 
The metaphysical system is the basis for expressing the Christian faith 
in philosophical terms and concepts, that is, in dogmas. Different metaphysi-
cal systems, different definitions and comprehensions of the concepts and 
terms produce different ways for expressing the dogmas. Among the Anti-
ochene thinkers and theologians, there was the use of an elaborated version 
of the Aristotelian metaphysical system regarding the substance and its 
kinds. This elaborated version began with the Cappadocians, namely Grego-
ry of Nyssa who mixed Aristotle‟s and Stoicism‟s doctrines on the substanc-
es.  
This Antiochene system consists of three kinds of nature: abstract na-
ture (the species), concrete nature (singular and particular), and partial na-
ture, i.e., nature in intermediate status (not abstract and not particular). We 
also find such division in some commentators of Aristotle, under a Stoic in-
fluence, which means that it was a current philosophical system94. Babai the 
Great, in a decisive moment of his church, developed a metaphysical system 
that had as its basis the system circulating among the Antiochenes, with the 
purpose of defending the Christological doctrine of the two natures, two hy-
postases, and one person. His starting point, then, was Christological, and 
consequently he had to apply his system to the Trinitarian field.  
Nature (kyānā) is an abstract reality, hypostasis (qnōmā) is a nature in 
intermediate status, i.e., it has the natural properties of the species to whom it 
belongs, however still not personalized. It is concrete reality and singular na-
ture, but without specific properties which make it distinct from the other 
hypostases subject to the same common nature. This distinction is made by 
the person (parṣōpā) that each hypostasis possesses, which is the group of 
the individual properties. According to this system, the divine nature is ab-
stract reality; the three divine hypostases (qnōmē) are subject to this reality 
and manifest perfectly its natural properties. These three hypostases are dis-
tinct through the particular person (parṣōpā) of each one, the group of the 
particular properties of each qnōmā. In the Christological field, Christ is two 
natures, i.e., two different substances. These natures are distinct through 
their natural properties that are manifested by the qnōmā of each one, and 
                                                            
94) Cf. TURCESCU, Gregory of Nyssa, p. 70. 
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because of this, the two realities are also two qnōmē, i.e., two distinct and 
different concrete natures. These two qnōmē, however, are personalized by 
the same parṣōpā, i.e., the common parṣōpā of filiation. 
If for Babai the starting point was the Christological doctrine for which 
he developed his metaphysical system and then applied it to the Trinitarian 
field, for Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, the starting point was the Trinitarian doctrine. He 
elaborated and modified Babai‟s system, applied it to his Trinitarian doc-
trine, and then came to use his new approach in the Christological field. We 
can say that Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib adopted Babai‟s system when he talks metaphysi-
cally, i.e., when he gives definitions for the metaphysical concepts. When he 
had to apply it, however, in Trinitarian and Christological doctrine, he had to 
make a modification, an elaboration and interpretation. While the theological 
and doctrinal content of both theologians was identical, that is, the faith of 
the Church of the East, the context of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib was different: 1) we 
have the return of the discussion on the Trinity and also on the person of 
Christ; 2) we have a new language and a different philosophical lexicon. 
This element, in fact, was the reason behind the interpretation that Ibn aṭ-
Ṭayyib made of Babai‟s system. 
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib used the same basis as Babai, i.e., the doctrine regarding 
the three kinds of nature. He was able to accept such a division, since he was 
an Aristotelian philosopher and commentator, and since such a system was 
also adopted by other commentators of Aristotle. In addition, he was familiar 
with the use of this system by Babai. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, then, on the one hand, 
wanted to maintain the basis of the Cappadocians‟ doctrine, and on the other, 
he knew that Babai‟s system, with some modification, could be helpful in 
explaining the Trinitarian faith to Muslims. We understand this modification 
as an Aristotelian interpretation of Babai‟s system, and not simply an appli-
cation of the Cappadocians‟ thought into Babai‟s system, since Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib 
approached the Cappadocians‟ doctrine through an Aristotelian reading. 
The three divine aqānīm, then, are the composition of the divine es-
sence with essential attributes that describe the common divinity. These 
three hypostases are not partial natures, since their attributes are specific; 
they manifest the inter-trinitarian relation. For this reason, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib was 
able to affirm that the aqānīm describe the essence, and they are not three 
separated realities, that is, they are not three divinities. As a consequence, 
trying to avoid the accusation of being tritheistic, he did not apply the term 
person (farṣūf/šaḫṣ) in his Trinitarian doctrine. The metaphysical function of 
this concept was given to the concept of property/attribute (ḫāṣṣah/ṣifah), 
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which is related to the hypostasis. In this way, he was able to say that the 
three Christian hypostases are three distinct essential attributes of God‟s one 
essence, and not three individuals or three singular separated divine sub-
stances.  
From this starting point, he also modified the Christological doctrine by 
not calling the one Christ and Son “person” (šaḫṣ). Consequently, the union 
took place in the property of the filiation and not in the parṣōpā of the Son 
that was given to the human nature in Christ, as Babai teaches. That being 
so, the natures in Christ are two, and these two natures have one attribute, 
and are two hypostases (aqānīm). Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib was able to affirm that the 
union was between one uqnūm, the Son, and not the whole Trinity, with one 
single human being, i.e., one human uqnūm, which is person (šaḫṣ), that is, 
separated concrete nature.  
In this way he could:  
1) reply to Muslims and prove to them that the three aqānīm are essen-
tial attributes of God, and not three gods;  
2) explain that there are differences between essential attributes and 
verbal ones;  
3) maintain his ecclesiastical tradition of not using the term person in 
Trinitarian doctrine;  
4) give the metaphysical function of person to the property;  
5) apply, after this modification, Babai‟s system to the Cappadocians‟ 
doctrine with an Aristotelian approach;  
6) avoid the accusation of tritheism by using the term “person” only in 
an anthropological doctrine; and  
7) express the Christological faith of his church using this system. 
Finally, we conclude by saying that the work of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib was more 
than a mere transmission of the doctrine of Babai or the Cappadocians, and 
was more than an elaboration of it or a simple modification. Rather, it should 
be considered a doctrinal and philosophical development within the Church 
of the East and Christian thought.  
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